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1CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1  Motivation
A major motivation for accounting research is providing evidence on how 
earnings is useful to a wide range of users in making economic decisions.  Of particular 
interest over the last decade has been the issue of the quality of accounting reports, 
particularly the quality of earnings.  For instance, in September 1998, Arthur Levitt, the 
Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), presented “The Numbers 
Game” topic at New York University and called attention to an escalating problem with 
the quality of financial reporting in filings with the SEC.  This topic received a great deal 
of attention over the next several years and is an important issue today because of the 
reliance of both U.S. and non-U.S. capital markets on credible financial reporting.  The 
question of earnings usefulness is of major importance to users of financial information 
as well as to practitioners, regulators, and accounting researchers since earnings is widely 
believed to be the premier information item provided in financial statements (Lev 1989).  
Schipper and Vincent (2003) explain the importance of earnings quality as follows:
 From an investment perspective, low-quality earnings are undesirable because 
they provide a defective resource allocation signal.  Low-quality earnings are 
inefficient because they reduce economic growth by causing capital to be 
misallocated.
2 From a financial information user perspective, earnings, and metrics derived 
from it, are commonly used in compensation arrangements and in debt 
agreements.  For example, overstated earnings, used as an indicator of 
managers’ performance, will result in overcompensation to managers.  Similarly, 
overstated earnings might mask deteriorating solvency, leading lenders 
mistakenly to continue lending or to defer foreclosure.  
 From an accounting standard setting perspective, accounting standard setters 
seek feedback on whether the standards they promulgate are effective, they tend 
to focus on outputs, including reporting earnings.  The FASB’s Conceptual 
Framework points to decision usefulness as the benchmark for assessing 
effectiveness.1
Teets (2002) documents three distinct sets of decisions that affect the quality of 
earnings: (1) decisions made by standard setters, (2) choices made by management about 
which accounting methods should be chosen from a set of acceptable alternatives, and (3) 
judgments and estimates made by management in order to implement the chosen 
alternatives.2  Besides the three factors, several international studies (e.g., Ali and Hwang 
2000; Ball et al. 2000; Hung 2001; Leuz et al. 2003; Ashbaugh and LaFond 2003; 
DeFond et al. 2004; Fulkerson et al. 2004) reveal that a number of important differences 
1
 Conceptual frameworks of other accounting standard-setters such as International Accounting Standard 
Board (IASB) and Accounting Standard Board (ASB) also point to decision usefulness as the benchmark 
for assessing effectiveness.  The objective of IASB’s framework is to provide information about the 
financial position, performance, and changes in financial position of an enterprise that is useful to a wide 
range of users in making economic decisions. 
2
Teets (2002) documents that earnings management is a concept related to earnings quality, but clearly not 
synonymous.  Earnings management activities can affect quality of earnings on each of these three 
dimensions.
3in the properties of earnings among countries are shaped by the extent of legal protection 
afforded outside investors from expropriation by controlling shareholders or managers.  
This study attempts to explore the relationship between cross-country differences 
in the quality of reported earnings (proxied by four accounting-based earnings attributes) 
and investor protection.  Definitions of earnings quality and investor protection, the 
importance of a linkage between them, and the contribution of this study are described as 
follows.
1.2  What Is Earnings Quality? 
“Quality of earnings” is a multidimensional concept and there is no agreed-upon 
definition in the literature.  Schipper and Vincent (2003) define the quality of earnings as 
the extent to which reported earnings faithfully represent Hicksian income.3  Since the 
Hicksian income is unobservable, Schipper and Vincent (2003) consider three earnings 
quality constructs: persistence; predictive ability; and the time-series variance of earnings 
as measures of earnings quality.4  These constructs are consistent with the Conceptual 
Framework which suggests that earnings quality might be assessed by some combination 
3
Financial Accounting Standard Board (FASB) (1980) documents that representational faithfulness means 
“correspondence or agreement between a measure or description and the phenomenon that it purports to 
represent” (See FASB Concept No. 2, para. 63).  Hicks (1939) defines “Hicksian: income as the amount 
that can be consumed (that is, paid out as dividends) during a period, while leaving the firm equally well 
off at the beginning and the end of the period.  With this concept, high earnings quality occurs when 
earnings are closer to Hicksian income.
4
 The time-series variance of earnings are (1) the relations among cash, accruals, and income, (2) the 
correspondence to relevance, reliability, and comparability, and (3) the effects of implementation decisions 
(e.g., unintentional estimation errors in accruals and intentional accruals manipulations).
4of persistence, predictive ability, and variability of earnings5 (Schipper and Vincent 
2003).  
The empirical literature has developed certain measures of earnings quality.  
Appendix 1 describes how prior research studies define and measure quality of earnings.  
Studies such as Dechow and Dichev (2002), Balsam et al. (2003), Francis et al. (2003), 
and Myers et al. (2003) use accruals quality to draw conclusions about earnings quality 
and view earnings to be of higher quality if accruals quality is high.6 Dechow and 
Dichev (2002), Beneish and Vargus (2002), Penman and Zhang (2002), and Richardson 
(2003) view earnings to be of higher quality when earnings is more persistent.  Mikhail et 
al. (2003) define earnings quality as the extent to which a firm’s past earnings is 
associated with its future cash flows, where high earnings quality occurs when a firm’s 
earnings has high predictability.  Some studies such as Lang et al. (2003) and Ball and 
Shivakumar (2004) view earnings to be of higher quality when it has less earnings 
management and more timely recognition of bad news.  
As discussed more fully in Section 3, this study uses the following earnings 
attributes as indicators of earnings quality: (1) accruals quality, which refers to the extent 
to which accruals shift or adjust the recognition of cash flows over time so that the 
adjusted number (earnings) measures firm performance and predicts future earnings and 
cash flows, (2) earnings persistence, which refers to the extent to which an innovation 
(unexpectedness) in the earnings series causes investors to revise their future earnings 
5
 The variability of earnings refers to the time-series variance of earnings which are the relations among 
cash, accruals and income, the correspondence to relevance, reliability, and comparability, and the effects 
of implementation decisions (e.g. unintentional estimation errors in accruals and intentional accruals 
manipulations).
6
 Accruals quality refers to the extent to which accruals map into the related cash flow realization, where a 
high match signifies high accruals quality (Dechow and Dichev 2002). 
5expectations7 (Kormendi and Lipe 1987; Lev 1989), (3) earnings predictability, which 
refers to the ability of earnings to predict itself, and (4) earnings smoothness, which refers 
to the use of accruals to smooth earnings.  In this study, higher quality of earnings occurs 
when firm has (1) high accruals quality that shifts or adjusts the recognition of cash flows 
over time so that the adjusted earnings better measures firm performance and better 
predicts the future earnings and cash flows, (2) persistent components embedded in 
earnings that are sustainable, (3) high earnings predictability such that past earnings can 
predict future earnings very well,8 or (4) less earnings smoothness such that firm’s 
management has not engaged in smoothing practices.9
Evaluating the quality of earnings helps the financial statement users make 
judgments about the “certainty” of current income and the prospects for the future 
(Deloitte & Touche 2004).  The following describes benefits of high quality of earnings:
Financial information user perspective
 Financial statements provide “actual” firm performance and high quality financial 
information that will be of real value to investors (Ricol 2004).
 Business decisions are improved as financial information users receive “true” firm 
performance for their decision making.  For example, better accounting 
7
 Unexpected earnings consists of “persistent” and “transitory” components.  Earnings persistence affects 
expectations of future earnings and cash flows while transitory earnings does not affect expectations.
8
 Since earnings predictability refers to the ability of past earnings to predict future earnings (Lipe 1990), it 
is linked to a specific task, and is a decreasing function of the variance of earnings innovations.  Hence, 
there is a possible contradiction between the persistence and predictive ability of earnings (i.e., earnings 
that are of high quality on the persistence dimension may be of low quality on the predictive ability 
dimension).
9
 Management can engage in earning smoothing practices by introducing transitory components to the 
income series in order to decrease time-series variability and increase earnings predictability (Schipper and 
Vincent 2003).  In addition, Former SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt (1998) holds that managers smooth 
earnings because they believe investors prefer smoothly increasing earnings.  
6information helps investors and managers identify and distinguish between good 
and bad opportunities for investing financial capital and increasing the 
productivity of assets in place (Bushman and Smith 2001).
Investment perspective
 High quality earnings supports the development of capital markets, an especially 
important goal in emerging economies, in the European Union, and elsewhere.  
When the public is not confident in the financial reporting process or in the 
financial information released as part of that process, they are discouraged from 
making investments.  This, in turn, prevents capital market growth (Ricol 2004).
 High quality earnings supports higher economic growth as it increases the 
credibility of financial information which is directly linked to economic 
development (Ricol 2004).
 High quality earnings results in lower cost of capital as it reduces information risk 
that is associated with decreased cost of equity and increased trading.  An increase 
in earnings opacity is linked to an increase in the cost of equity and a decrease in 
trading in the stock markets (Bhattacharya et al. 2003).  
 Greater willingness on the part of investors to invest across borders.  When 
investors are confident with a firm’s earnings quality in a country, they invest 
more for securities in that country.  
Accounting standard setting perspective
 High quality earnings supports more efficient allocation of resources as it 
provides financial information that will be of real value to policy makers (i.e., the 
accounting profession, regulators, and financial institutions) who are faced with 
7making decisions on how to allocate both financial and personal resources to aid 
economic development (Ricol 2004).
 High quality earnings supports the objective of conceptual frameworks in 
providing useful information such as a firm’s performance to financial accounting 
users.
1.3  What Is Investor Protection?
Investor protection is defined as the protection of outside investors by the 
enforcement of regulations and laws (Shleifer and Wolfenzon 2002) or as a key 
institutional factor affecting firm policy choices such as shareholder voting rights and 
financial system policies (Shleifer and Vishny 1997; La Porta et al. 2000).  La Porta et al. 
(2000) indicate that protected shareholder rights include those to receive dividends on 
pro-rata terms, to vote for directors, to participate in shareholders’ meeting, to subscribe 
to new issues of securities on the same terms as the insiders, to sue directors or the 
majority for suspected expropriation, and to call extraordinary shareholders’ meeting.  If 
there is no investor protection, insiders can steal a firm’s profits by manipulating 
accounting numbers.  For example, insiders can use their financial reporting discretion to 
(1) overstate earnings and conceal unfavorable earnings realizations (i.e., losses) that 
would prompt outsider interference, and (2) understate earnings in years of good 
performance by creating reserves for future periods, effectively making reported earnings 
less variable than the firm’s true economic performance (Leuz et al. 2003).10  Hence, 
investors should understand the differences in laws and the effectiveness of investors’ 
10
 The term “insiders” is referred to both managers and controlling shareholders (La Porta et al. 2000).
8enforcement across countries in order to protect their rights and make sure that the returns 
on their investments will not be expropriated by the controlling shareholders or managers 
(La Porta et al. 2000).  The following are benefits of high investor protection:
Financial markets
 Investor protection encourages the development of financial markets.  When 
investors are protected from expropriation, they pay more for securities, making it 
more attractive for entrepreneurs to issue these securities (La Porta et al. 2000).
 Countries that protect shareholders have more valuable stock markets, larger 
numbers of listed securities per capita, and a higher rate of IPO (initial public 
offering) activity than do the unprotective countries (La Porta et al. 1997). 
Real consequences
 Investor protection influences the real economy (La Porta et al. 2000).  For 
example, high investor protection supports financial development and can 
accelerate economic growth by (1) enhancing saving, (2) channeling these savings 
into real investment and thereby foster capital accumulation, and (3) allowing 
capital to flow toward the more productive uses, and thus improve the efficiency 
of resource allocation (Beck et al. 2000).
 Country-level legal institutions are crucial elements in explaining capital market 
development (La Porta et al. 2000; Shleifer and Wolfenzon 2002).
1.4  A Linkage Between Investor Protection and Earnings Quality
The extent of investor protection varies greatly around the world.  Shleifer and 
Vishny (1997) state that in some countries such as the United States, Japan, and 
9Germany, the law protects the rights of at least some investors and the courts are 
relatively willing to enforce these laws.  But even in these countries, the legal system 
leaves managers and controlling owners with considerable discretion to manage reported 
earnings in order to mask true firm performance and to conceal their private control 
benefits from outsiders.  In most of the rest of the world, the extent of investor protection 
is less protective and courts function less well as they consider only the clearest 
violations of investor rights.  As a result, legal protection alone becomes insufficient and 
accounting information such as earnings cannot reflect the “true” economic performance.  
The quality of reported earnings in a country could be low because of a complex 
interaction among managerial motivation, accounting standards, and investor protection.  
For example, managers are motivated to manipulate earnings, and they can do this either 
because accounting standards allow substantial flexibility, accounting standards do not 
exist to specify accounting principles related to some areas of business activity, or 
accounting standards, though rigorous, are weakly enforced (Bhattacharya et al. 2003).  
The level of investor protection and the quality of enforcement differ greatly and 
systematically across countries.  Part of these differences in investor protections cause 
differences in the nature and effectiveness of financial systems around the world (La 
Porta et al. 1997).  Bushman and Smith (2001) document that laws can protect investors 
from expropriation by corporate insiders.  Thus, earnings quality around the world could 
vary based on the differences in investor protection and the quality of enforcement.  This 
study hypothesizes that high earnings quality should be found in firms from countries 
with high investor protection.
10
Previous research related to a linkage between investor protection and earnings 
quality is relatively scarce.  Most related studies have focused on the effect of investor 
protection on earnings management (Leuz et al 2003), value relevance of earnings (Ali 
and Hwang 2000; Hung 2001), and informativeness of reported earnings (Ball at el. 
2000).  Leuz et al. (2003) find less earnings management in countries with stronger 
investor protection.  Bhattacharya et al. (2003) find that an increase in overall earnings 
opacity in a country is linked to an increase in the cost of equity and a decrease in trading 
in the stock market of that country.  Ali and Hwang (2000) document that earnings in the 
U.S. is more value relevant than earnings in other countries because of the differences in 
country-specific factors.  Hung (2001) concludes that shareholder protection improves 
the effectiveness of accrual accounting.  Ball et al. (2000) document that an important 
difference between common law and code law countries is the manner of resolving 
information asymmetry between managers and potential users of accounting income, 
including debt and equity investors, employees, suppliers and customers.  These prior 
studies show the importance of an individual country’s investor protection on the quality 
of accounting information.  However, they focus on one aspect of earnings attributes11
such as earnings smoothness or value relevance of earnings.  Hence, this study extends 
prior research by examining four accounting-based earnings attributes and exploring the 
effect of investor protection on the quality of earnings (proxied by these four earnings 
attributes) across countries.  
11
Francis et al. (2004) examine seven earnings attributes: accruals quality, persistence, predictability, 
smoothness, value relevance, timeliness, and conservatism.  They characterize the first four attributes as 
accounting-based because they are typically measured using accounting information only.  The last three 
attributes were characterized as market-based because proxies for these constructs are typically based on 
relations between market data and accounting data.  This study employs the first four earnings attributes.
11
1.5  Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this study is to examine the linkage between investor protection 
and reported earnings quality.  Establishing such a link provides evidence of the role of 
investor protection in improving earnings quality.  Research on a linkage between 
investor protection and earnings quality is beneficial.  First, a financial reporting system 
supported by strong governance, high quality standards, and sound regulatory framework 
is a key to economic development (Wong 2004).  High earnings quality reduces the risk 
to shareholders, creditors, and others contracting with the firm and plays an integral role 
in contributing to a country’s economic growth and financial stability.  Second, 
differences in legal institutions can affect the usefulness of accounting income numbers.  
For example, one reason why the usefulness of earnings and the role of earnings in firm 
valuation may not generalize internationally relates to the differences in earnings quality 
as affected by these differences.  
1.6  Contribution
This study contributes to the accounting literature in the following ways.  First, 
prior research has focused on cross-country differences in the properties of earnings (e.g., 
Alford et al. 1993; Ball et al. 2003; Ali and Hwang 2000) using one aspect of earnings 
attributes.  This study is one of the first to explore cross-country differences in the 
properties of reported earnings using four accounting-based earnings attributes to draw 
conclusions about earnings quality.  Second, this study extends prior studies such as 
DeFond et al. (2004), Ashbaugh and LaFond (2003), Leuz et al. (2003), Bhattacharya et 
al. (2003), Hung (2001), Ball et al. (2000), and Ali and Hwang (2000) by investigating 
12
the effects of investor protection on accounting-based earnings attributes and earnings
quality.  Finally, the findings of this study have implications for security analysts, 
regulators, standard setters, and other accounting information users in enhancing their 
understanding of legal institutional differences and their impact on the properties of 
reported earnings.  
13
CHAPTER 2
REVIEW OF LITERATURE
Previous research related to the effects of legal protection of investors on 
accounting-based earnings attributes is relatively rare.  There are some recent studies 
using individual countries as the unit of analysis to examine the effects of certain legal 
institutional variables on (1) earnings management (Leuz et al. 2003; Ashbaugh and 
LaFond 2003; Fulkerson et al. 2004; Haw et al. 2004), (2) value relevance of earnings 
and book value of equity (Ali and Hwang 2000; Hung 2001), and (3) informativeness of 
reported accounting income (Ball at el. 2000, 2003; Defond et al. 2004).  Using 
individual countries as the unit of analysis, this study explores the effects of legal 
protection of investors on accounting-based earnings attributes and earning quality 
(captured by these four earnings attributes) across countries.  The following are prior 
accounting related studies involving the legal protection of investors.
2.1  Foundation of Investor Protection Studies
Meek and Thomas (2004) indicate that the foundation for accounting related 
studies involving the legal protection of investors is La Porta et al. (1997, 1998, and 
2000). La Porta et al. (1997) use a sample of 49 countries and document that countries 
with poorer investor protection, measured by both the character of legal rules and the 
quality of law enforcement, have smaller and narrower capital markets.  Using the same
14
sample of 49 countries, La Porta et al. (1998) examine legal rules covering protection of 
corporate shareholders and creditors, the origin of these rules, and the quality of their 
enforcement.  They document that common law countries generally have the strongest 
and French-civil-law countries the weakest, legal protection of investors, with German-
and Scandinavian-civil-law countries located in the middle.  La Porta et al. (2000)
describe the differences in laws and the effectiveness of investors’ enforcement across 
countries, discuss the possible origins of these differences, summarize their 
consequences, and assess potential strategies of corporate governance reform.  They 
argue that the legal approach is a more fruitful way to understand corporate governance 
and its reform than the conventional distinction between bank-centered and market-
centered financial systems.  Recently, La Porta et al. (2004) examine the effect of 
securities laws on stock market development in 49 countries and find little evidence that 
public enforcement benefits stock markets, but strong evidence that laws mandating 
disclosure and facilitating private enforcement through liability rules benefit stock 
markets.
2.2  Effects of Institutional Variables on Earnings Management
Leuz et al. (2003) examine systematic differences in earnings management across 
31 countries and find that earnings management decreases in investor protection because 
strong protection limits insiders’ ability to acquire private control benefits, thereby 
reducing their incentives to mask firm performance.  Bhattacharya et al. (2003) construct 
15
an overall earnings opacity12 measure using three dimensions of reported accounting 
earnings across 34 countries: earnings aggressiveness, loss avoidance, and earnings 
smoothing.  They document that an increase in overall earnings opacity in a country is 
linked to an economically significant increase in the cost of equity and an economically 
significant decrease in trading in the stock market of that country.  Ashbaugh and LaFond 
(2003) investigate whether the quality of working capital accruals differs systematically 
in international markets and whether differences in quality are associated with firm-
specific and institutional factors that drive the demand for accounting information.  They 
find that legal environment and the alignment between tax and book reporting are a 
significant determinants of working capital accruals quality.  
Fulkerson et al. (2004) highlight important legal, political, and cultural 
dimensions along with common law and code law countries and formulate testable 
hypotheses about how these differences are likely to influence earnings management and 
earnings quality.  Their results indicate that earnings management is lower and earnings 
quality is higher in common law countries than in code law countries.  Haw et al. (2004)
examine the role of both legal and extra-legal institutions in limiting income management 
and document that a common law tradition and an efficient judicial system subsume the 
effects of the other legal institutions, and that a high rate of tax compliance subsumes the 
effects of the other extra-legal institutions in curbing insider income management.
12
 They define the earnings opacity of a country as the extent to which the distribution of reported earnings 
of firms in that country fails to provide information about the distribution of the true, but unobservable, 
economic earnings of firms in that country.
16
2.3  Effects of Institutional Variables on Value Relevance of Earnings
Ali and Hwang (2000) explore the relationship between measures of the value-
relevance of financial accounting data and several country-specific factors.  They find 
that value relevance of financial reports is lower for countries where (1) the financial 
systems are bank-oriented rather than market-oriented, (2) private-sector bodies are not 
involved in the standard-setting process, (3) accounting practices follow the Continental 
model as opposed to the British-American model, (4) tax rules have a greater influence 
on financial accounting measurements, and (5) spending on auditing services is relatively 
low.  Hung (2001) shows that the use of accrual accounting (versus cash accounting) 
negatively affects the value relevance of financial statements in countries with weak 
shareholder protection.  This negative effect, however, does not exist in countries with 
strong shareholder protection.
2.4  Effects of Institutional Variables on Informativeness of Earnings
Ball et al. (2000) characterize the ‘shareholder’ governance models of common 
law countries as resolving information asymmetry by public disclosure while the 
‘stakeholder’ governance model of code law countries resolves information asymmetry 
through private communication.  Accounting income in code law countries is directly 
linked to current payouts (to employees, managers, shareholders, and governments) and 
they find that it is less timely, particularly in incorporating economic losses.  Their results 
show that the demand for accounting income in different institutional contexts causes its 
properties to vary internationally.  Guenther and Young (2000) investigate how cross-
country differences in financial accounting standards affect the relation between financial 
17
accounting earnings and real economic value-relevant events that underlie those earnings.  
They find that accounting earnings in the UK and the US are more closely related to 
underlying economic activity than accounting earnings in France and Germany because 
of (1) differences in legal systems and the demand for accounting information, (2) 
differences in legal protection for external shareholders, and (3) differences in the degree 
of tax conformity in their sample countries.  
Ball et al. (2003) examine properties of accounting income in four East Asian 
countries whose standards derive from common law sources (U.K., U.S., and IAS).  
Using timely recognition of economic income (particularly losses) as a proxy for 
financial reporting quality, they document that earnings timeliness of these East Asian 
countries is not higher than that of code law countries.  DeFond et al. (2004) examine the 
information content of annual earnings announcements in 26 countries and find that they 
are more informative in countries with stronger legal institutions that protect investors’ 
rights.  They also document that annual earnings announcements are more informative in 
countries with higher quality earnings, better enforced insider trading laws, or more value 
relevant earnings, and that annual earnings’ announcements are less informative in 
countries with more frequent interim financial reporting.
2.5  Summary
In sum, prior studies investigate the effects of certain legal institutional variables 
on earnings management, value relevance of earnings, and informativeness of reported 
earnings.  The value relevance literature examines associations between economic 
income, measured using equity returns, and accounting numbers such as earnings and 
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reveals which countries experience greater associations between accounting numbers and 
equity returns.  The earnings management literature investigates the effect of institutional 
factors on earnings management across countries.  The informativeness of reported 
earnings literature shows the potential causes of variation in earnings informativeness 
around the world.  However, all of these studies consider only one attribute of earnings 
such as earnings smoothness.  This study explores four attributes of earnings in order to 
draw a conclusion of earnings quality and show how institutional factors affect the 
quality of earnings around the world.
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CHAPTER 3
THEORETICAL SUPPORT
3.1  Earnings Attributes Measures
In this section, four earnings attributes are described with an explanation of how 
prior research has characterized each attribute.  The four earnings attributes are accruals 
quality, earnings persistence, earnings predictability, and earnings smoothness.
3.1.1  Accruals Quality
Several measures to assess earnings quality indicate that earnings which maps more 
closely into cash is more desirable (e.g. Francis et al. 2004; Penman 2001; Harris et al. 
2000).  The gap between earnings and cash is from accruals.  One role of accruals is to 
shift or adjust the recognition of cash flows over time so that the adjusted numbers 
(earnings) better measure firm performance.  However, accruals require assumptions and 
estimates of future cash flows.  Thus, accruals are the product of judgments, estimates, 
and allocations.  Dechow and Dichev (2002) (hereafter, DD) develop a measure of 
accruals quality and argue that the quality of accruals and earnings is decreasing in the 
magnitude of estimation error in accruals.  The DD model uses firm-specific regressions 
of changes in working capital on last year, present, and one-year ahead cash flows from 
operations and defines accruals quality as a standard deviation of the residual from this 
firm-specific regression.  
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However, McNichols (2002) proposes a modified Dechow and Dichev (2002) 
model, arguing that the changes in sales revenue and property, plant, and equipment are 
important in forming expectations about current accruals, over and above the effects of 
operating cash flows.  She shows that applying variables from the Jones (1991) model 
and modified Jones model (Dechow et al. 1995) into the cross-sectional DD model 
significantly increases its explanatory power and thus reduces measurement error.  The 
accrual estimation errors using a residual ( t ) is measured from the following equation:
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Where:
TCAj,t =
=
Firm j’s total current accruals in year t.
(CAj,t - CLj,t - Cashj,t + STDEBTj,t + TPj,t).
TotalAssetj,t-1 = Firm j’s total assets in year t-1 (#G107).
CFOj,t = Firm j’s cash flow from operations in year t.
This CFO is calculated as net income before extraordinary items 
(#G378) less total accruals (TA).13
REVj,t = Firm j’s change in total revenue between year t-1 and t.  
PPEj,t = Firm j’s property, plant, and equipment in year t (#G639).
13
 Variable CFO is available as a data item for US firms as it is required by SFAS No. 95, but not for all 
non-U.S. firms.  Consistent with Leuz et al. (2003) and Bhattacharya et al. (2003), this study uses the 
indirect (balance sheet) approach to estimate accruals rather than the direct (statement of cash flows) 
approach.  Although the indirect approach may suffer from measurement error in accruals, especially for 
firms with merger and acquisition activity or discontinued operations (Hribar and Collins 2002), it allows 
this study to calculate accruals for a larger sample of firms across countries (when there are differences in 
the presentation of cash flow information across countries and time) than is possible in the direct approach.  
In fact, many of sample countries in this study do not require the preparation or presentation of a statement 
of cash flows.
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TAj,t =
=
Firm j’s total accruals in year t.
(CAj,t - CLj,t - Cashj,t + STDEBTj,t + TPj,t – Depj,t).
CAj,t = Firm j’s current assets in year t (#G638).
CLj,t = Firm j’s current liabilities in year t (#G650).
Cashj,t = Firm j’s cash in year t (#G628).
STDEBTj,t = Firm j’s debt in current liabilities in year t (#G132).
TPj,t = Firm j’s taxes payable in year t (#G161).
Depj,t = Firm j’s depreciation and amortization expenses in year t 
(#G399).
This study employs the modified DD model proposed by McNichols 2002 and 
assumes that uncertainty in accruals (proxied by standard deviation of the residual) is best 
captured by this model.  The measure of accruals quality is based on this standard 
deviation of estimated residual ( )ˆ(
,tj , hereafter, Stdresid) from equation (1) as it refers 
to the extent to which working capital accruals map into operating cash flow realizations.  
Large (small) values of Stdresid correspond to lower (higher) accruals quality and lower 
(higher) earnings quality.
3.1.2  Earnings Persistence
Kormendi and Lipe (1987) use firm-level regressions of current earnings on last 
year’s earnings to estimate the slope coefficient estimates of earnings persistence.  This 
study employs the measure in Kormendi and Lipe (1987) and uses the following 
equation:
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Where:
Earnj,t = Firm’s j net income before extraordinary items in year t (#G378).
Earnj,t-1 = Firm’s j net income before extraordinary items in year t-1.
The measure capturing earnings persistence is based on the slope coefficient 
estimate (1, hereafter, Persist) from equations (2).  Values of 1 close to one (or greater 
than one) indicate highly persistent earnings while values close to zero imply highly 
transitory earnings.  Persistent earnings are viewed as higher quality, while transitory 
earnings are viewed as lower quality. 
3.1.3  Earnings Predictability
Lipe (1990) provides a measure of earnings predictability as it is reflected in the 
variance of the earnings shocks (as variance increases, the predictability decreases).  
Francis et al. (2004) also follow his study by measuring earnings predictability using the 
square root of the estimated error variance from the earnings persistence equation.  In this 
study, earnings predictability is calculated using the square root of the error variance 
from equation (2).  Predictability is:
Predj, t = )ˆ( ,2 tj (3)
Where:
Predj,t = Firm j’s earnings predictability in year t, captured by the square 
root of the error variance from equation (2).
)ˆ(
,
2
tj = Estimated error variance of firm j in year t, calculated from 
equation (2).
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Large (small) values of Pred imply less (more) predictable earnings.  More 
predictable earnings are viewed as higher quality, while less predictable earnings are 
viewed as lower quality.
3.1.4  Earnings Smoothness
Wysocki (2004) suggests a measure of earnings quality using closeness-to-cash as 
a benchmark because it provides a direct benchmark for the absolute magnitude of 
“economic income.”  He states that while discretionary accruals models control for firm 
and industry characteristics, they fail to identify a benchmark for the underlying 
“economic income” that is being managed.  Leuz et al. (2003) and Burgstahler et al. 
(2004) suggest a possible solution to this problem by introducing a closeness-to-cash 
benchmark for underlying “economic income” using absolute working capital accruals as 
a measure of earnings management and then scaling this measure by absolute cash flow 
from operations.  They also define earnings smoothness as the ratio of the firm-level 
standard deviations of operating income and operating cash flow (both scaled by lagged 
total assets). Bowen et al. (2003) measure earnings smoothness as the standard deviation 
of operating cash flows divided by the standard deviation of earnings.  Similarly, Francis 
et al. (2004) measure earnings smoothness as the ratio of firm j’s standard deviation of 
net income before extraordinary items divided by beginning total assets, to its standard 
deviation of cash flow operations divided by beginning total assets.
Following Bowen et al. (2003), this study measures earnings smoothness as the 
ratio of the firm-level standard deviation of operating cash flows to the standard deviation 
of earnings (both scaled by beginning total assets).  This measure is also similar to the 
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one found in Hunt et al. (1997), Leuz et al. (2003), Pincus and Rajgopal (2002), and 
Francis et al. (2004).  
Smoothj, t = )/(
)/(
1,,
1,,


tjtj
tjtj
sTotalAssetEarn
sTotalAssetCFO

 (4)
Where:
Smoothj,t = Firm j’s earnings smoothness in year t.
 = Firm j’s standard deviation
CFOj,t = Firm j’s operating cash flows in year t (indirect approach)
(Earnj,t) = Firm j’s net income before extraordinary items in year t 
(#G378). 
Ratios in excess one indicate more variability in operating cash flows relative to 
the variability of earnings, which implies the use of accruals to smooth earnings.  Thus, 
large (small) values of Smooth indicate more (less) earnings smoothness and low (high) 
earnings quality.  
3.2  Investor Protection Measures
This study employs eight institutional characteristics from La Porta et al. (1997, 
1998, 2004) and defines them as investor protection proxies: (1) antidirector rights, (2) 
efficiency of the judicial system, (3) rule of law, (4) corruption index, (5) ratio of the 
stock market capitalization held by minorities to gross domestic product, (6) ratio of the 
number of domestic firms to the population, (7) ratio of the number of initial public 
offerings of equity to the population, and (8) ownership concentration.  La Porta et al. 
(1998) use proxies 2, 3, and 4 to measure the level of legal enforcement in different 
countries.  Leuz et al. (2003) use proxies 5, 6, and 7 to proxy the importance of equity 
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markets across countries.  However, this study considers these proxies individually and 
uses them to characterize the sample countries into three distinct clusters using K-means 
cluster analysis.  Table 2 presents eight investor protection proxies of the sample 
countries.  The following sections explain how prior research has characterized these 
eight proxies.
3.2.1  Antidirector Rights
Following La Porta et al. (1998), this study defines antidirector rights using an 
index aggregating shareholder rights.  This index is formed by adding 1 when (1) the 
country allows shareholders to mail their proxy vote to the firm, (2) shareholders are not 
required to deposit their shares prior to the general shareholders’ meeting, (3) cumulative 
voting or proportional representation of minorities in the board of directors is allowed, (4) 
an oppressed minorities mechanism is in place, (5) the minimum percentage of share 
capital that entitles a shareholder to call for an extraordinary shareholders’ meeting is less 
than or equal to 10 percent (the sample median), or (6) shareholders have preemptive 
rights that can be waived only by shareholders’ vote.  The index ranges from zero to six, 
with higher scores implying stronger antidirector rights and better investor protection.
3.2.2  Law Enforcement: Efficiency of Judicial System
Based on La Porta et al. (1998, 2000, 2004), efficiency of the judicial system is an 
index representing the average of investors’ assessment of conditions of the judicial 
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system in each country between 1980 and 1983.  The index ranges from 0 to 10, with 
higher scores implying greater legal enforcement and better investor protection14.
3.2.3  Law Enforcement: Rule of Law
Based on Kaufmann et al. (2004) and La Porta et al. (2004), rule of law is an 
index representing the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules 
of society in year 2000.  These include perceptions of the incidence of both violent and 
non-violent crime, the effectiveness and predictability of the judiciary, and the 
enforceability of contrasts.  This estimate ranges from –2.5 to 2.5, with higher scores 
implying greater legal enforcement and better investor protection.  
3.2.4  Law Enforcement: Corruption Index
Based on Kaufmann, et al. (2004) and La Porta, et al. (2004), corruption index is 
an index measuring the exercise of public power for private gain in year 2000.  This 
index captures aspects ranging from the frequency of additional payments to get things 
done to the effects of corruption on the business environment.  The index ranges from
–2.5 to 2.5, with higher scores implying greater legal enforcement and better investor 
protection.
3.2.5  Importance of Equity Market: External Cap/GDP Ratio
Based on La Porta et al. (2004), External Cap/GDP ratio is the ratio of the stock 
market capitalization held by minorities to gross domestic product for the period of   
14
 Source: International Country Risk Guide.
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1996 - 2000.  The stock market capitalization held by minorities is computed as the 
product of the aggregate stock market capitalization and the average percentage of 
common shares not owned by the top three shareholders in the ten largest non-financial, 
privately-owned domestic firms in a given country.15  This study uses this ratio to 
measure the importance of the equity market in each country, with higher values 
indicating the greater importance of the stock market and better investor protection.
3.2.6  Importance of Equity Market: Domestic Firms/Pop Ratio
Based on La Porta et al. (2004), Domestic Firms/Pop ratio is the ratio of the 
number of domestic firms listed in a given country to its population (in millions) for the 
period of 1996-2000.16  This study uses this ratio to measure the importance of the equity 
market in each country, with higher values indicating the greater importance of the stock 
market and better investor protection.
3.2.7  Importance of Equity Market: IPOs/GDP Ratio
Based on La Porta et al. (2004), IPOs/GDP ratio is the ratio of equity issued by 
newly-listed firms in a given country (in thousands) to its gross domestic product (in 
millions) for the period of 1996-2000.17  This study uses this ratio to measure the 
importance of the equity market in each country, with higher values indicating the greater 
importance of the stock market and better investor protection.
15
 Source: La Porta et al. (1999), Hartland-Peel (1996) for Kenya, Bloomberg and various annual reports 
for Ecuador, Jordan, and Uruguay.
16
 Source: International Finance Corporation: Emerging Market Database (2001) and World Bank 
(2001).
17
 Source: Securities Data Corporation, World Bank (2001).
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3.2.8  Ownership Concentration
Following La Porta et al. (2004), the ownership concentration is measured as the 
average percentage of common shares owned by the top three shareholders in the ten 
largest non-financial, privately-owned domestic firms in a given country.  A firm is 
considered privately owned if the State is not a known shareholder in it.18  This average 
percentage of each country indicates a country’s ownership concentration, with lower 
values reflecting better investor protection.
18
 Source: La Porta et al. (1999), Hartland-Peel (1996) for Kenya, Bloomberg and various annual reports 
for Ecuador, Jordan, and Uruguay.
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CHAPTER 4
STATEMENT OF HYPOTHESES
This chapter develops hypotheses related to the linkage between investor 
protection and various measures of earnings quality.  Figure 1 presents eight institutional 
characteristics believed to affect each of the earnings attributes in both U.S. and non-U.S. 
firms.  With this relationship, this study hypothesizes that firms with the least favorable 
values of each earnings attribute generally occur in countries whose institutional 
characteristics provide weaker protection of investors than in countries with stronger 
investor protection.  The first hypothesis stated in alternative form is: 
H1:   Firms with the least favorable values of each earnings attribute (considered 
individually) generally occur in countries whose institutional characteristics 
provide weaker protection of investors than in countries with stronger 
investor protection.
The next step is based on what this study finds in hypothesis 1.  If the results of 
hypothesis 1 are consistent across each of the earnings attributes (i.e., all four earnings 
attributes are high quality in countries whose institutional characteristics provide stronger 
investor protection), the next step is described in Section 4.1.  If the findings of 
hypothesis 1 are mixed (i.e., countries whose institutional characteristics provide stronger 
investor protection have both favorable and unfavorable values for some of their earnings 
attributes), the next step is described in Section 4.2.
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4.1  Results of H1 Are Consistent Across Four Earnings Attributes  
If results of hypothesis 1 are consistent across each of the four earnings attributes, 
this study will construct an overall summary measure of earnings quality and use this 
summary measure to draw a conclusion of earnings quality across sample countries.  This 
summary is called an aggregate earnings quality measure and is computed by averaging 
the country rankings for the four individual earnings attributes.  Earnings quality is 
expected to be lower in countries whose institutional characteristics provide weaker 
investor protection.  And, the potential hypothesis 2 stated in alternative form is:
H2:  Earnings quality (captured using aggregate earnings quality score) is 
expected to be lower in countries whose institutional characteristics provide 
weaker protection of investors than in countries with stronger investor 
protection.
4.2  Results of H1 Are Mixed Across Four Earnings Attributes  
If results of hypothesis 1 are mixed across each of the four earnings attributes, this 
study will consider each of the earnings attributes individually since conclusions about 
earnings quality and investor protection depend on how earnings quality is defined.  
Thus, this study will focus more on how each of the investor protection variables affects 
each of the earnings attributes and examine only hypothesis 1.
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CHAPTER 5
DATA AND SAMPLE SELECTION
This study selects all firm-year observations in all countries that have the required 
financial data to estimate all empirical models in this study.  All data are from the Global 
Vantage Industry Research and Industry Active Files for the fiscal years 1994 to 2003.  
Since the accounting quality model 1 requires changes in working capital and past and 
future cash flows from operations to estimate total accruals, this restricts the sample 
period of this study to the period 1996 to 2002.  This study restricts the sample to 
industrial firms and excludes all firms with SIC codes 6000-6999 and 9000-9999, as in 
Barth et al. (1999), Leuz et al. (2003), and Burgstahler et al. (2004).  This restriction is 
used to exclude banks and financial institutions and to increase the homogeneity of the 
sample and the comparability of the results across countries.  
Following La Porta (1997, 1998, and 2000), this study begins with the same 49 
countries as in these studies and eliminates countries with fewer than 200 firm-year 
observations to compute each of the firm-level variables in the analysis.  Each firm must 
have income statement and balance sheet information for at least three consecutive years.  
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Finally, this study trims the top and bottom 1 percent of the sample with respect to 
change in total assets, total current accruals, and change in net income before 
extraordinary items.19  These restrictions result in a final sample of 57,610 firm-year 
observations drawn from 31 countries.
Since this study’s goal is to examine the impact of country-level institutions on 
each of four accounting-based earnings attributes, this study assigns firm-year 
observations to countries based on Global Vantage Database’s country code of 
incorporation (CINC).20  Table 1, Panel A shows all firm-year observations for each 
legal origin over the same period of this study.  The first and second highest firm-year 
observations are from “English” and “German” legal origin countries (44.3 percent and 
37.6 percent, respectively).  Table 1, Panel B presents the final sample of 31 countries 
over the period 1996-2002.  Nearly 55.7 percent of the sample consists of firm-year 
observations from United Kingdom (3,230 observations), Japan (16,461 observations), 
and the United States (12,380 observations).21
As noted previously, this study employs eight investor protection variables based 
on La Porta et al. (2004) and Kaufmann et al. (2004).  Since most of the variables are 
available for the period of 1996-2000, this study estimates investor protection variables 
19
 All accounting variables are scaled by lagged total assets.
20
 Classifying firms on the basis of their country of incorporation in Global Vantage Database assumes 
that home-country institutions are expected to have the strongest influence on observed earnings attributes.  
However, this assumption may introduce a bias into the study since firms engaged in cross-border product 
or financial transactions could also be influenced by the institutions of those additional countries.  To that 
extent, cross-border transactions are expected to diminish the power of this study’s tests.
21
 When a study’s tests are based on pooled firm-year observations, the dominance of these observations, 
as well as their strong correlation with code/common law institutional distinctions, could affect a study’s 
primary tests.  However, this study should not be affected because the research design is based on pooled 
results of firm-year observations per country per year, consistent with most country-year investor 
protection observations.
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for the period of 2001 and 2002 using the 2000 data.22  Table 2 shows the average values 
of each investor protection variables across 31 countries over the period of 1996 to 2002. 
22
 The values of antidirector rights as reported in La Porta et al. (1998) are the 1998 values and the same 
across the eight years 1996-2002.  The values of efficiency of judicial system as reported in La Porta et al. 
(2004) are the 1980-83 values and the same across the eight years 1996-2002.  The values of rule of law as 
reported in La Porta et al. (2004) are the 2000 values and the same across the eight years 1996-2002.  The 
values of corruption index as reported in Kaufmann et al. (2004) and La Porta et al. (2004) are the 2000 
values and the same across the eight years 1996-2002.  The values of ownership concentration as reported 
in La Porta et al. (2004) are the 1999 values are the same across the eight years 1996-2002.  The rest of the 
variables are data per country per year from the period of 1996-2000.  By using data from prior studies, an 
unavoidable limitation of this study is that some of these particular investor protection measures are 
constant over the test period.
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CHAPTER 6
RESEARCH DESIGN
6.1  K-means Cluster and Correlation Analyses
This study takes the following steps to test hypothesis 1.  First, a K-means cluster 
analysis based on MacQueen (1967) is used to group countries by their level of investor 
protection, based on the institutional characteristics discussed earlier.23  Second, each of 
the four earnings attributes is measured for the companies in the sample using a pooled 
regression per country per year in order to get 217 country-year accounting observations, 
calculated from a product of 31 countries and 7 years.  These 217 country-year earnings 
attribute observations are then averaged by country.  Then, this country mean value is 
assigned to its investor protection cluster.  Based on hypothesis 1, the study hypothesizes 
that clusters with lower levels of investor protection should have the least favorable 
values of these attributes, and vice-versa.24  To test hypothesis 1, this study uses K-
means cluster and correlation analyses to see whether the least (most) favorable values of 
each earnings attribute generally occur in countries whose institutional characteristics 
provide weaker (stronger) investor protection.
23
 K-means clustering is one of the simplest unsupervised learning algorithms that solves the clustering 
problem by classifying a given data set into a certain number of clusters.  The algorithm is composed of the 
following steps: (1) place K points into the space represented by the objects that are being clustered, (2) 
assign each object to the group that has the closest centroid, (3) recalculate the positions of the K centroids 
when all objects have been assigned, (4) repeat Steps 2 and 3 until the centroids no longer move.
24
 Least favorable values of the four earnings attributes are low accruals quality, low earnings persistence, 
less predictable earnings, and high earnings smoothness.
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If the results of hypothesis 1 are consistent across all four earnings attributes, this 
study will rank each of the earnings attributes across countries and use these ranks to 
form an aggregate earning quality (EQ) score.  As before, each country’s aggregate 
earnings quality score is then assigned to that country’s investor protection cluster.  
Clusters with lower levels of investor protection should have lower earnings quality, and 
vice-versa. 
If the results of hypothesis 1 are mixed across each of the four earnings attributes, 
this study considers each earnings attribute and makes a conclusion of earnings quality 
based on how earnings quality is individually defined.  Thus, this study will focus more 
on how each investor protection variable affects each of the earnings attributes rather 
than an aggregate earnings quality score.
6.2  Regression Analysis
This study also uses regression analysis to examine the effect of investor 
protection on each earnings attribute and if the results of hypothesis 1 are consistent, the 
aggregate earnings quality score.  A control variable for public enforcement is included 
since it has an impact on earnings attributes (Bushman and Piotroski 2005).
6.2.1  Results of H1 Are Consistent Across Four Earnings Attributes  
This study uses regression analysis to examine the relation between each of the 
earnings attributes and investor protection and between aggregate earnings quality 
measure and investor protection as follows: 
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EQk,jt = jtjiji iableControlVarorRightsAntidirect 	 +++ 1 (5.K.1)
EQk,jt = jtjiji iableControlVarstemJudicialSy 	 +++ 1 (5.K.2)
EQk,jt = jtjiji iableControlVarRuleofLaw 	 +++ 1 (5.K.3)
EQk,jt = jtjiji iableControlVarCorruption 	 +++ 1 (5.K.4)
EQk,jt = jtjiji iableControlVarpExternalCa 	 +++ 1 (5.K.5)
EQk,jt = jtjiji iableControlVarrmsDomesticFi 	 +++ 1 (5.K.6)
EQk,jt = jtjiji iableControlVarIPOs 	 +++ 1 (5.K.7)
EQk,jt = jtjiji iableControlVarOwnership 	 +++ 1 (5.K.8)
EQ Score,jt = jtjiji iableControlVarorRightsAntidirect 	 +++ 1 (6.1)
EQ Score,jt = jtjiji iableControlVarstemJudicialSy 	 +++ 1 (6.2)
EQ Score,jt = jtjiji iableControlVarRuleofLaw 	 +++ 1 (6.3)
EQ Score,jt = jtjiji iableControlVarCorruption 	 +++ 1 (6.4)
EQ Score,jt = jtjiji iableControlVarpExternalCa 	 +++ 1 (6.5)
EQ Score,jt = jtjiji iableControlVarrmsDomesticFi 	 +++ 1 (6.6)
EQ Score,jt = jtjiji iableControlVarIPOs 	 +++ 1 (6.7)
EQ Score,jt = jtjiji iableControlVarOwnership 	 +++ 1 (6.8)
Where:
EQk,jt = Dimension of earnings attributes (k = 1,2,3,4)
EQ1,jt = Country j’s accruals quality rank variable at time t.
EQ2,jt = Country j’s earnings persistence rank variable at time t.
EQ3,jt = Country j’s earnings predictability rank variable at time t.
EQ4,jt = Country j’s earnings smoothness rank variable at time t.
EQ Scorejt = Country j’s aggregate earnings quality rank variable at 
time t.
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Control Variablejt = Country j’s public enforcement.  This variable is 
measured at the country level as the mean of four 
underlying indices: Supervisor Characteristics index, 
Investigative Powers index, Orders index, and Criminal 
index.  The variable is ranked between 0 (weak public 
enforcement) to 1 (strong public enforcement) based on 
La Porta et al. (working paper, 2004).
Public enforcement variable is included to control for the impact of public 
enforcement on earnings attributes.  Bushman and Piotroski (2005) find that stronger 
public enforcement aspects of securities law discourage “optimism” by slowing 
recognition of good news in earnings relative to firm in countries with weak public 
enforcement aspects.  Thus, this study includes the public enforcement variable as a 
control variable for all equations. 
The values of coefficient estimate ( 1	 ) estimate the magnitude of the impact of 
an investor protection variable on an earnings attribute or the overall earnings quality 
score.  Based on hypotheses 1, this study expects positive signs of 1	 for earnings 
persistence (captured by “Persist”) and the first seven investor protection variables and
negative signs for earnings persistence and the eighth investor protection variable.  The 
study expects negative signs of 1	  for earnings smoothness (captured by “Smooth”), 
accruals quality (captured by “Stdresid”), and earnings predictability (captured by 
“Pred”) and the first seven investor protection variables.  Positive signs are expected for 
these three earnings attributes and the eighth investor protection variable.
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6.2.2  Results of H1 Are Mixed Across Four Earnings Attributes  
This study uses regression analysis to examine the relation between each of the 
earnings attributes and investor protection as follows:
EQk,jt = jtjiji iableControlVarorRightsAntidirect 	 +++ 1 (5.K.1)
EQk,jt = jtjiji iableControlVarstemJudicialSy 	 +++ 1 (5.K.2)
EQk,jt = jtjiji iableControlVarRuleofLaw 	 +++ 1 (5.K.3)
EQk,jt = jtjiji iableControlVarCorruption 	 +++ 1 (5.K.4)
EQk,jt = jtjiji iableControlVarpExternalCa 	 +++ 1 (5.K.5)
EQk,jt = jtjiji iableControlVarrmsDomesticFi 	 +++ 1 (5.K.6)
EQk,jt = jtjiji iableControlVarIPOs 	 +++ 1 (5.K.7)
EQk,jt = jtjiji iableControlVarOwnership 	 +++ 1 (5.K.8)
Where:
EQk,jt = Dimension of earnings attributes (k = 1,2,3,4)
EQ1,jt = Country j’s accruals quality rank variable at time t.
EQ2,jt = Country j’s earnings persistence rank variable at time t.
EQ3,jt = Country j’s earnings predictability rank variable at time t.
EQ4,jt = Country j’s earnings smoothness rank variable at time t.
Control variablejt = Country j’s public enforcement.  This variable is 
measured at the country level as the mean of four 
underlying indices: Supervisor Characteristics index, 
Investigative Powers index, Orders index, and Criminal 
index.  The variable is ranked between 0 (weak public 
enforcement) to 1 (strong public enforcement) based on 
La Porta et al. (working paper, 2004).
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In sum, this study examines hypothesis 1 using cluster/correlation and regression 
analyses.  Hypothesis 1 is examined using individual earnings attributes measures.  If the 
results of hypothesis 1 are consistent, hypothesis 2 is examined using an aggregate 
earnings quality score and based on cluster/correlation analysis and regression analysis.
40
CHAPTER 7
RESULTS
This chapter presents results of the study.  Sections 7.1 and 7.2 discuss descriptive 
statistics and the cluster analysis of institutional characteristics and earnings attributes, 
respectively.  Section 7.3 provides Pearson (Spearman-rank) correlation matrix between 
raw (rank) data of earnings attributes and investor protection variables.  Regression 
analysis and sensitivity tests are presented in Sections 7.4 and 7.5, respectively. Section 
7.6 summarizes the findings in this study.  
7.1  Descriptive Statistics 
This section provides descriptive statistics for both institutional characteristics 
and earnings attributes.  Section 7.1.1 presents descriptive statistics of institutional 
variables.  Section 7.1.2 presents descriptive statistics of earnings attributes variables.
7.1.1  Descriptive Statistics: Institutional Characteristics
Table 2, Panel A provides descriptive statistics on the institutional characteristics 
of each sample country.  These investor protection variables are presented using the 
average values of each institutional variable from 1996 to 2002.  Not surprisingly, the 
highest level of investor protection can be found in most developed countries including 
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the United Kingdom, the United States, Australia, Sweden, Canada, Hong Kong, 
Singapore, and Norway.  
Table 2, Panel B presents expected signs between institutional variables.  The 
study expects a positive correlation between the first seven institutional variables and a 
negative correlation between the eighth variable and other variables.  Table 2, Panel C 
presents correlation coefficients between institutional variables.  The Pearson correlation 
coefficients are presented in the upper half and the Spearman-rank correlation 
coefficients are presented in the lower half.  The results of Table 2, Panel C show that the 
correlation coefficients between institutional characteristics have signs consistent with 
the study’s expectations.  In other words, the results show all positive signs for 
correlations between the first seven institutional characteristics and negative signs for 
correlations between the eighth institutional characteristics (Ownership) and other 
institutional characteristics.      
7.1.2  Descriptive Statistics: Earnings Attributes
Table 3, Panel A presents the number of firm-year observations per country and 
the average values of the main accounting variables used to calculate each of the earnings 
attributes.  These variables are scaled by lagged total assets, consistent with much of the 
literature using international data (Leuz et al. 2003; Bhattacharya et al. 2003; Wysocki 
2005).  Table 3, Panel B provides descriptive statistics of the average values of four 
earnings attributes variables.  The raw earnings attributes variables are obtained from 
earnings attribute measures using the main variables in Table 3, Panel A.  The rank
earnings attributes variables are obtained from ranking each earnings attribute (raw data) 
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across countries.  To be consistent across the four earnings attributes, this study ranks 
earnings persistence in ascending order and the other three attributes in descending order, 
so that high rank values indicate high earnings quality.
Table 3, Panel C presents expected signs and correlation coefficients between 
earnings attributes.  Again, the Pearson correlation coefficients are presented in the upper 
half and the Spearman-rank correlation coefficients are presented in the lower half.  The 
results (right-hand side) based on Pearson and Spearman-rank correlations indicate that 
earnings smoothness (captured by “Smooth”) has a negative correlation with accruals 
quality (captured by “Stdresid”) and earnings predictability (captured by “Pred”), which 
is inconsistent with the study’s expectation.  The impact of this unexpected result is 
discussed later in the results sections.
7.2  Cluster Analysis
This section provides K-means cluster analysis data for both institutional 
characteristics and earnings attributes.  Section 7.2.1 presents K-means cluster analysis of 
institutional variables.  Section 7.2.2 presents K-means cluster analysis of earnings 
attributes variables.
7.2.1  K-Means Cluster Analysis: Institutional Characteristics
This study uses eight institutional variables to group sample countries with similar 
institutional characteristics.  These proxies are standardized to z-scores and a K-means 
cluster analysis with three distinct clusters is conducted.  This approach is similar to that 
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of Leuz et al. (2003)25 except that this study uses the most recent La Porta et al. data 
(2004) and does not include a disclosure index as it is likely that this index is highly 
correlated to each country’s earnings attributes.  Table 4, Panel A reports means of each 
cluster and tests of differences between clusters.  The results show that the first cluster is 
characterized by extensive outsider rights, strong legal enforcement, larger stock markets, 
and low ownership concentration.  The second and third clusters are characterized by 
lower outsider rights, weaker legal enforcement, smaller stock markets, and higher 
ownership concentration.  Thus, the first cluster is referred to as “outsider economies” 
and the other two clusters are referred to as “insider economies”, with the distinction that 
countries in the second cluster have significantly better legal enforcement, larger stock 
markets, and lower ownership concentration than those in the third cluster.        
Table 4, Panel B presents cluster membership of the sample countries across three 
distinct clusters.  Interestingly, all countries (except Sweden) in the first cluster are 
common law while all countries in the second cluster are code law.  This is consistent 
with the existence of institutional complementarities found in most finance literature.  
The third cluster consists of both common law and code law countries.  Consistent with 
Ball et al. (2003), Malaysia and Thailand whose standards derive from common law 
sources (US, UK, and IAS) are placed in the third cluster as their financial reporting 
quality (captured by timely loss recognition) is not higher than under code law due to the 
higher incentives of the managers and auditors responsible for the financial statement 
25
 Leuz et al. (2003) consider the K-means cluster analysis based on nine institutional variables from La 
Porta et al. (1997, 1998).  They standardize nine variables to z-scores and use a K-means cluster analysis to 
classify 31 countries into three distinct country clusters.
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preparation.  However, Singapore is still placed in the first cluster, inconsistent with the 
findings in Ball et al. (2003).  
Table 4, Panel C shows that almost all cluster membership of countries (except 
Malaysia, Norway, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, and Sweden) in this study is 
similar to that of Leuz et al. (2003).  The difference in cluster membership of this study 
and that of Leuz et al. (2003) may reflect the developments of countries’ investor 
protection level as their investor protection proxies increased or decreased.  For example, 
Sweden moved from Cluster 2 to Cluster 1, South Korea and Spain moved from Cluster 3 
to Cluster 2, Malaysia stepped down from Cluster 1 to Cluster 3, and the other two 
countries stepped down to the next lower cluster level from the period in Leuz et al. 
(2003) to the period in this study.
7.2.2  K-Means Cluster Analysis: Earnings Attributes
Table 5 presents mean values of rank data of four accounting based-earnings 
attributes across three distinct clusters based on a k-means cluster analysis.  Table 5, 
Panels A1-A4 report the cluster membership for the 31 sample countries based on cluster 
analysis performed on the investor protection proxies in Table 2.  Countries in each 
cluster are sorted by the mean-rank scores of accruals quality for Panel A1, earnings 
persistence for Panel A2, earning predictability for Panel A3, and earnings smoothness 
for Panel A4.  Table 5, Panel B reports the means by cluster based on raw and rank data 
of each earnings attribute.
Table 5, Panel A1 provides the rankings of accruals quality across 31 countries of 
the three clusters this study identifies.  Japan (29.57) has the highest average accruals 
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quality score, followed by Chile (28.71), Mexico (27.00), Brazil (25.86), Italy (23.57), 
Switzerland (24.00), India (21.57), and Austria (22.43).  These countries represent the 
country sample with high earnings quality.  Interestingly, most of these countries are not 
members of Cluster 1, but members of Clusters 2 and 3.  Indonesia (4.00), Germany 
(4.14), Australia (5.00), USA (7.57), Norway (7.71), Sweden (8.57), and Hong Kong 
(9.00) show the lowest average accruals quality score in the sample.  Most of these 
countries are from Cluster 1.  The results based on mean-rank accruals quality score 
contradict hypothesis 1.
Table 5, Panel A2 provides the rankings of earnings persistence across 31 
countries of the three clusters this study identifies.  India (25.86) has the highest average 
earnings persistence score, followed by Netherlands (22.14), USA (22.14), Finland 
(20.43), Taiwan (20.43), Chile (19.86), Greece (19.43), and Sweden (18.71).  These 
countries represent the country sample with high earnings quality.  Hong Kong (6.57), 
Australia (8.86), South Africa (9.43), Mexico (10.43), Norway (10.86), and Austria 
(11.71) show the lowest average earnings persistence score in the sample.  No particular 
patterns by cluster are revealed for earnings persistence.  The results based on mean-rank 
earnings persistence score contradict hypothesis 1 since the results are mixed across 
clusters.
Table 5, Panel A3 provides the rankings of earnings predictability across 31 
countries of the three clusters this study identifies.  Japan (30.57) has the highest average 
earnings predictability score, followed by India (27.00), Chile (25.86), Greece (23.14), 
Switzerland (22.86), Spain (22.86), Italy (22.00), and Brazil (21.71).  These countries 
represent the country sample with high earnings quality.  Interestingly, most of these 
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countries are not members of Cluster 1, but members of Clusters 2 and 3.  Norway (3.29), 
Australia (3.57), USA (3.71), Hong Kong (5.71), Canada (6.43), UK (8.57), and Sweden 
(9.43) show the lowest average earnings predictability score in the sample.  Again, most 
of these countries are from Cluster 1 and the results based on mean-rank earnings 
predictability score contradict hypothesis 1.
Table 5, Panel A4 provides the rankings of earnings smoothness across 31 
countries of the three clusters this study identifies.  The United States (29.00) has the 
highest average mean-rank earnings smoothness score, followed by UK (26.14), Canada 
(23.86), Hong Kong (23.57), Norway (23.14), Australia (21.43), and Sweden (21.14).26
These countries represent the country sample with high earnings quality.  Interestingly, 
most of these countries are members of Cluster 1.  Greece (6.14), Spain (6.14), Italy 
(7.57), Japan (9.00), South Korea (9.43), and Chile (12.43) show the lowest average 
earnings smoothness score in the sample.  All of these countries are from Clusters 2 and 
3.  The results based on mean-rank earnings smoothness are consistent with hypothesis 1. 
Table 5, Panel B presents mean values of the four accounting based-earnings 
attributes across three distinct clusters based on a K-means cluster analysis.  The results 
based on raw data show that the first cluster is characterized by low accruals quality, low 
predictive ability of earnings, and low earnings smoothness.  The second and third 
clusters are characterized by high accruals quality, high predictive ability of earnings, and 
high earnings smoothness.  Both raw and rank data indicate that mean values of all 
26
 To receive the average ranking (or mean-rank) of a country’s earnings smoothness scores, this study 
uses all seven rank time-series earnings smoothness scores of a country and takes the average of these 
scores to receive the average ranking of a country’s earnings smoothness scores.  For instance, the United 
States is ranked 30th in 1996, 31st in 1997, 28th in 1998, 30th in 1999, 31st in 2000, 28th in 2001, and 25th in 
2002 based on its earnings smoothness raw scores.  As a result, the average ranking of earnings smoothness 
scores of the United States is 29. 
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earnings attributes (except earnings persistence) in Cluster 1 are statistically different 
from those in Clusters 2 and 3.  However, there is no statistical difference between mean 
values of each earnings attribute in Cluster 2 and those in Cluster 3.  For earnings 
persistence, the results indicate that the mean values of each cluster are not statistically 
different across clusters implying that there is no effect of differences in institutional 
characteristics on earnings persistence in each institutional cluster.  The results based on 
the rank data are consistent with those based on the raw data.
In sum, the results based on mean-rank earnings smoothness score are consistent 
with the theory indicating that countries with high investor protection have less earnings 
management and high earnings quality.  However, the results based mean-rank accruals 
quality and earnings predictability scores contradict the results based on mean-rank 
earnings smoothness score.  This contradicts the theory and implies that countries with 
low investor protection have high accruals quality and high earnings predictability.  In 
addition, the results based on mean-rank earnings persistence score do not show any 
relationship between investor protection and earnings persistence across clusters.  In 
other words, differences in investor protection across countries do not cause differences 
in earnings persistence across clusters.  
7.3  Correlation Analysis: Earnings Attributes and Institutional Characteristics
Table 6, Panel A presents expected signs and correlation coefficients between 
earnings attributes and institutional characteristics based on Spearman-rank correlations.  
The results of Panel A show that earnings smoothness (captured by “Smooth”) is lower 
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for countries with high antidirector rights (p-value27 < .001), strong judicial system (p-
value < .001), strong rule of law (p-value = .005), low corruption (p-value = .007), strong 
external capitalization (p-value < .001), more domestic firms (p-value < .001), more IPOs 
(p-value = .004), and low ownership concentration (p-value < .001).  Interestingly, Panel 
A shows opposite results for accruals quality and earnings predictability.  In other words, 
the results indicate that accruals quality (captured by “Stdresid”) is higher (which means 
lower accruals quality) for countries with high antidirector rights (p-value = .063), strong 
judicial system (p-value = .005), strong rule of law (p-value = .013), low corruption (p-
value = .007), strong external capitalization (p-value = .005 ), more domestic firms (p-
value < .001), more IPOs (p-value = .004), and low ownership concentration (p-value = 
.081).  Similarly, earnings predictability (captured by “Pred”) is higher (which means 
lower predictive ability of earnings) for countries with high antidirector rights (p-value = 
.013), strong judicial system (p-value = .001), strong rule of law (p-value = .004), low 
corruption (p-value = .003), strong external capitalization (p-value = .004), more 
domestic firms (p-value < .001), more IPOs (p-value = .003), and low ownership 
concentration (p-value = .087).  In addition, the results present no correlation between 
earnings persistence (captured by “Persist”) and the first seven institutional 
characteristics.  This means that differences in institutional characteristics do not affect 
differences in earnings persistence across countries, but countries with low ownership 
concentration appear to have high earnings persistence.
Table 6, Panel B presents expected signs and Spearman-rank correlation 
coefficients of the four earnings attributes based on rank score and institutional 
27
 P-values are not reported in the table.
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characteristics.  Since the study applies the comparable rank scores across four earnings 
attributes, the study expects all positive signs between four earnings attributes rank scores 
and the first seven institutional variables and negative signs between four earnings 
attributes rank scores and the eighth institutional variables.  The results (right-hand side) 
are consistent with those in Panel A.
In sum, the results of correlation analysis between institutional characteristics and 
earnings attributes are mixed.  If the study defines earnings quality based on earnings 
smoothness, the results are consistent with the study’s hypothesis 1 implying that less 
earnings smoothness appears to be found in countries whose institutional characteristics 
are strong (i.e., countries in Cluster 1).  However, if the study defines earnings quality 
based on accruals quality and earnings predictability, the results contradict the 
hypothesis, indicating that high accruals quality and high predictive ability of earnings 
appear to be found in countries whose institutional characteristics are weak (i.e., 
countries in Clusters 2 and 3).  Finally, if earnings quality is defined as earnings 
persistence, the results show no effect of differential institutional characteristics on 
earnings persistence, except that countries with low ownership concentration appear to 
have high earnings persistence.
7.4  Regression Analysis
The cluster and correlation analyses suggest that earnings smoothness, accruals 
quality, and earnings predictability are systematically related to a country’s institutional 
characteristics.  However, their results are mixed as earnings smoothness (captured by 
“R_Smooth”) is positively related to the first seven institutional variables and negatively 
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related to the eighth institutional variable while accruals quality (captured by 
“R_Stdresid”) and earnings predictability (captured by “R_Pred”) are negatively related 
to the first seven institutional variables and positively related to the eighth institutional 
variable.  To strengthen the finding in previous sections, the study uses multiple 
regressions to examine the relation between earnings attributes (rank score) and 
institutional variables using the following models:
- Model 1: Earnings attribute = f (InvRights) + control variable
- Model 2: Earnings attribute = f (JudicSys) + control variable
- Model 3: Earnings attribute = f (Ruleoflaw) + control variable
- Model 4: Earnings attribute = f (Corruption) + control variable
- Model 5: Earnings attribute = f (ExtCap) + control variable
- Model 6: Earnings attribute = f (DoFirms) + control variable
- Model 7: Earnings attribute = f (IPOs) + control variable
- Model 8: Earnings attribute = f (Ownership) + control variable
The results of these regression models are presented in Table 7.  Table 7, Panel A 
presents the results based on the association between accruals quality and institutional 
characteristics.  Table 7, Panel B presents the results based on the association between 
earnings persistence and institutional characteristics.  Table 7, Panel C presents results 
based on the association between earnings predictability and institutional characteristics.  
The results based on the association between earnings smoothness and institutional 
characteristics are presented in Table 7, Panel D. 
Table 7, Panel A reports multiple regressions between accruals quality rank scores 
and institutional variables.  Inconsistent with hypothesis 1, the results in Panel A indicate 
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that accruals quality (captured by “R_Stdresid”) is negatively associated with judicial 
system (p<.01), rule of law (p<.01), corruption (p<.01), and the number of domestic firms 
(p<.05).  The rank scores of antidirector rights, IPOs, and ownership concentration are 
not significant.  The control variable is significant with the opposite sign of the 
prediction.
Table 7, Panel B reports multiple regressions between earnings persistence rank 
scores and institutional variables.  Inconsistent with hypothesis 1, the results in Panel B 
indicate that earnings persistence (captured by “R_Persist”) is not associated with most of 
institutional variables.  Only ownership concentration variable is significant (p<.01) with 
predicted sign.  The control variable is not significant in any model.
Table 7, Panel C reports multiple regressions between earnings predictability rank 
scores and institutional variables.  Inconsistent with hypothesis 1, the results in Panel C 
indicate that earnings predictability (captured by “R_Pred”) is negatively associated with 
judicial system (p<.01), rule of law (p<.01), corruption (p<.01), external capitalization 
(p<.05), the number of domestic firms (p<.05), and the number of IPOs (p<.10).  The 
control variable is significant with the opposite sign of the prediction.
Table 7, Panel D reports multiple regressions between earnings smoothness rank 
scores and institutional variables.  Consistent with hypothesis 1, the results in Panel D 
indicate that earnings smoothness (captured by “R_Smooth”) is positively associated with 
judicial system (p<.01), rule of law (p<.01), corruption (p<.01), external capitalization 
(p<.01), and the number of domestic firms (p<.05), and negatively associated with 
ownership concentration (p<.01).  The control variable is significant with the expected 
sign.
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In sum, the results based on multiple regressions are consistent with those based 
on cluster and correlation analyses.  This means that the results based on the association 
between institutional characteristics and earnings attributes are mixed.  Conclusions 
about earnings quality depend on how it is defined.  If earnings quality is defined using 
earnings smoothness, the results are consistent with the study’s hypothesis 1 implying 
that countries whose institutional characteristics are strong (i.e., countries in Cluster 1) 
appear to have less earnings smoothness.  However, if earnings quality is defined using 
accruals quality or earnings predictability, the results contradict the hypothesis indicating 
that countries whose institutional characteristics are weak (i.e., countries in Clusters 2 
and 3) appear to have high accruals quality and high predictive ability of earnings.  
Finally, if earnings quality is based on earnings persistence, the results show that 
countries with low ownership concentration appear to have high earnings persistence and 
no other institutional variables in this study affect differences in earnings persistence 
across countries.
7.5  Sensitivity Tests
This section includes sensitivity tests of the associations and correlations between 
earnings attributes and institutional characteristics.  Section 7.5.1 reports the sensitivity 
test of regression analysis between earnings attributes and institutional characteristics 
when the study uses the rank data rather than the raw data of institutional variables.  
Section 7.5.2 reports the sensitivity test of correlation matrix when all accounting 
variables in this study are scaled using average total assets rather than lagged total assets.  
Section 7.5.3 reports the sensitivity test of correlation matrix when the study excludes 
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change in taxes payable from the calculation of the total accruals (TA), total current 
accruals (TCA), and cash flows from operations (CFO).
7.5.1  Sensitivity Test: Earnings Attributes and Institutional Characteristics (Rank Data) 
To strengthen the findings in Table 7, this study considers rank data for 
institutional characteristics and uses the following models to test the association between 
earnings attributes and institutional characteristics.
- Model 1: Earnings attribute = f (R_InvRights) + control variable
- Model 2: Earnings attribute = f (R_JudicSys) + control variable
- Model 3: Earnings attribute = f (R_Ruleoflaw) + control variable
- Model 4: Earnings attribute = f (R_Corruption) + control variable
- Model 5: Earnings attribute = f (R_ExtCap) + control variable
- Model 6: Earnings attribute = f (R_DoFirms) + control variable
- Model 7: Earnings attribute = f (R_IPOs) + control variable
- Model 8: Earnings attribute = f (R_Ownership) + control variable
Where:
R_InvRights = Rank score of “InvRights” in an ascending order, with high 
rank score (31) implying high investor protection.
R_JudicSys = Rank score of “JudicSys” in an ascending order, with high 
rank score (31) implying high investor protection.
R_RuleofLaw = Rank score of “RuleofLaw” in an ascending order, with high 
rank score (31) implying high investor protection.
R_Corruption = Rank score of “Corruption” in an ascending order, with high 
rank score (31) implying high investor protection.
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R_ExtCap = Rank score of “ExtCap” in an ascending order, with high rank 
score (31) implying high investor protection.
R_DoFirms = Rank score of “DoFirms” in an ascending order, with high 
rank score (31) implying high investor protection.
R_IPOs = Rank score of “IPOs” in an ascending order, with high rank 
score (31) implying high investor protection.
R_Ownership = Rank score of “Ownership” in an ascending order, with high 
rank score (31) implying low investor protection.
Table 8, Panel A presents stronger results as compared to those in Table 7, Panel 
A.  The results of the association between accruals quality and institutional characteristics 
(using rank data) still report all four significant institutional variables in Table 7, Panel A.  
In addition, two more institutional variables (“R_ExtCap” and “R_IPOs”) turn from 
insignificant to significant at p<.05 and P<.01, respectively.  However, the ownership 
concentration is still not significant.  Again, these results are not consistent with 
hypothesis 1 and the control variable is still significant with the opposite sign of the 
prediction.
Table 8, Panel B presents similar results as compared to those in Table 7, Panel B.  
Again, these results of the association between earnings persistence and institutional 
characteristics (using rank data) are not consistent with hypothesis 1 and the control 
variable is still insignificant for all models.  Only ownership concentration variable is 
significant (p<.01) with the predicted sign.
Table 8, Panel C presents stronger results as compared to those of Table 7, Panel 
C.  The results of the association between earnings predictability and institutional 
characteristics (using rank data) still report all six significant institutional variables in 
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Table 7, Panel C.  In addition, one more institutional variable (“R_Ownership”) turns 
from insignificant to significant at p<.10 with the opposite sign.  Again, these results are 
not consistent with hypothesis 1 and the control variable is still significant with the 
opposite sign of the prediction.  
Table 8, Panel D presents stronger results as compared to those in Table 7, Panel 
D.  The results of the association between earnings smoothness and institutional 
characteristics (using rank data) still report all six significant institutional variables in 
Table 7, Panel D.  In addition, two institutional variables (“R_InvRights” and “R_IPOs”) 
turn from insignificant to significant at p<.10.  The ownership concentration is still 
negative and significant at p<.01.  Again, only the results based on earnings smoothness 
are consistent with hypothesis 1 and the sign prediction.  
7.5.2  Sensitivity Test: Scaling Accounting Variables Using Average Total Assets 
There are differences in prior research in measuring accruals using different types 
of scaling.  Some studies (e.g., Dechow et al. 1995; Hribar and Collins 2002; Leuz et al. 
2003; Bhattacharya et al. 2003; Kothari et al. 2005; Wysocki 2005) scale all accounting 
variables by lagged total assets while other studies (e.g., Sloan 1996; Dechow and Dichev 
2002; Desai et al. 2004; Francis et al. 2004) scale all variables by average total assets.  
Cheng and Thomas (2005) examine these different types of scaling and find that choices 
related to accrual measurement significantly impact the amount of evidence regarding the 
abnormal accrual anomaly in their study.  To determine whether the results of this study 
vary with different type of scaling, this study measures all accounting variables using 
average total assets rather than lagged total assets.  Table 9, Panel A reports Spearman-
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rank correlation coefficients between earnings attributes.  Consistent with the results in 
Table 3, Panel C, the results (right-hand side) based on Spearman-rank correlations 
indicate that earnings smoothness (captured by “Smooth”) has a negative correlation with 
accruals quality (captured by “Stdresid”) and earnings predictability (captured by 
“Pred”), which is inconsistent with the study’s expectation.  Table 9, Panel B reports 
Spearman-rank correlation coefficients between institutional characteristics and earnings 
attributes (rank score).  The results are consistent with those in Table 6, Panel B.
7.5.3  Sensitivity Test: Not Including Change in Taxes Payable in Total Accrual 
Calculation 
There are differences in prior research in estimating an accrual component of 
earnings.  Some studies (e.g., Sloan 1996; Dechow and Dichev 2002; Leuz et al. 2003; 
Bhattacharya et al. 2003; Desai et al. 2004; Wysocki 2005) include change in taxes 
payable as part of the estimation of the accrual component of earnings while other studies 
(e.g., Dechow et al. 1995; Hribar and Collins 2002; Francis et al. 2004; Kothari et al. 
2005) exclude change in taxes payable when calculating this accrual component.  To 
determine whether the results of this study vary if change in taxes payable is excluded in 
the calculation of total accruals (TA), total current accruals (TCA), and cash flows from 
operation (CFO).  Table 10, Panel A reports Spearman-rank correlation coefficients 
between earnings attributes.  Consistent with the results in Table 3, Panel C, the results 
(right-hand side) based on Spearman-rank correlations indicate that earnings smoothness 
(captured by “Smooth”) has a negative correlation with accruals quality (captured by 
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“Stdresid”) and earnings predictability (captured by “Pred”), which is inconsistent with 
the study’s expectation.  
Table 10, Panel B reports Spearman-rank correlation coefficients between 
institutional characteristics and earnings attributes (rank score).  The results are 
consistent with those in Table 6, Panel B.
7.6  Summary 
Overall, the K-means cluster, correlation, and regression analyses in previous 
sections all indicate mixed results across the four earnings attributes.  Consistent with 
Leuz et al. (2003), the findings based on earnings smoothness support the first hypothesis 
that  firms with the least favorable values of each earnings attribute (captured by earnings 
smoothness) generally occur in countries whose institutional characteristics provide 
weaker protection of investors than in countries with stronger investor protection.  
Conversely, this study finds opposite results when measuring earnings attributes based on 
accruals quality and earnings predictability and no association between differences in 
institutional characteristics and those of earnings persistence across countries.  This 
conclusion holds under the assumption that the four earnings attributes measures 
correctly proxy earnings quality.  It may be that the four earnings attributes measures 
used in this study are not (or are less) suitable in international settings.  These measures 
have been used extensively in prior research, but most prior studies are based on a single-
country setting, particularly the United States.  
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CHAPTER 8
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH
8.1  Summary and Conclusions
This study attempts to explore the relationship between cross-country differences 
in the quality of reported earnings (proxied by four accounting-based earnings attributes) 
and investor protection (proxied by eight national institutional characteristics), 
hypothesizing that the least favorable values of each earnings attribute (considered 
individually) generally occur in countries whose institutional characteristics provide 
weaker investor protection than in countries with stronger investor protection.  This study 
uses K-means cluster, correlation, and regression analyses to test the hypothesis.  
The results based on K-means cluster and correlation analyses between 
institutional characteristics and earnings attributes are mixed.  This means that if the 
study defines earnings quality based on earnings smoothness, the results are consistent 
with the study’s hypothesis implying that less earnings smoothness appears to be found in 
countries whose institutional characteristics are strong (i.e., countries in Cluster 1).  If the 
study defines earnings quality based on accruals quality and earnings predictability, the 
results contradict the study’s hypothesis, indicating that high accruals quality and high 
predictive ability of earnings appear to be found in countries whose institutional 
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characteristics are weak (i.e., countries in Clusters 2 and 3).  In addition, if the study 
defines earnings quality based on earnings persistence, the results show no effect of 
differential institutional characteristics on earnings persistence, except that countries with 
low ownership concentration appear to have high earnings persistence.  The regression 
results are consistent with those based on cluster and correlation analyses.  Thus, the 
results based on the association between institutional characteristics and earnings 
attributes are mixed.
There are several possible reasons for the mixed results.  First, it is possible that 
certain of the earnings attributes measures used in this study are not the right surrogates 
to capture earnings quality.  In other words, some of these measures may not be well-
specified when applied to international data.  For example, using a sample of U.S. and 
international firms, Wysocki (2005) documents that the widely-used Dechow and Dichev 
(DD, 2002) accruals quality model fails to capture, and even reverse ranks, firms’ 
earnings quality as this model is dominated by the negative contemporaneous correlation 
between accruals and cash flows.  The Wysocki (2005) result may explain the 
inconsistent results found in this study for accruals quality and earnings smoothness.  The 
results for earnings smoothness and predictability are also inconsistent in this study.  
Perhaps these two measures capture earnings quality oppositely in an international 
setting.  An argument can be made that smoother earnings are more predictable, and vice-
versa.  Countries (e.g., Japan or Greece) whose earnings are more smoothed may have 
more predictable earnings than countries (e.g., USA or UK) whose earnings are less 
smoothed.  
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The mixed results may also be due to the fact that the samples are not 
homogeneous across the countries represented.  They vary in terms of size and industry 
membership.  For example, it is likely that most countries in cluster 3 contain more small 
firms and firms engaged in “commodities” type of industry while most countries in 
cluster 1 contain large firms and firms with “hi-tech manufacturing” specialization.  The 
incentives and opportunities for corporate insiders to manipulate a company’s earnings 
probably vary across industries and size of company.
Finally, it may be that investor protection variables do not reflect a country’s 
“true” impact on earnings quality.  There might be other factors such as the nature of a 
country’s capital market itself driving the results of this study.  For example, in 
developing countries whose capital markets are less significant, there are fewer incentives 
for corporate insiders to manipulate earnings because not many investors are using 
financial information in decision making.  Managers in these countries have nothing to 
gain from manipulating earnings.  As a result, accruals quality or earnings predictability 
in developing countries may be higher than that in developed countries where capital 
markets are more significant and managers have more to gain from manipulating 
earnings.
The findings of this study provides some, though limited, insights into cross-
country differences in earnings attributes and linkage between these earnings attributes 
(as measures of earnings quality) and the protection of investors’ rights.  One implication 
is that conclusions about earnings quality depend on the definition of earnings quality.  
Another possible implication is that other national institutional characteristics besides 
investor protection may significantly influence measures of earnings quality.  Thus, 
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investors and other financial information users should exercise caution when considering 
the effect of investor protection on earnings quality across countries.  Furthermore, 
investors exposed to other equity markets (e.g., developed versus emerging equity 
markets) need to be aware of the effect of other institutional characteristic differences on 
earnings attributes when they invest time and effort in better understanding these 
differences across countries.
8.2  Limitations and Future Research
This study has some important limitations that need to be considered when 
interpreting the results.  First, it is possible that earnings attributes and investor protection 
variables are all impacted by unknown variables.  This could result in a spurious 
association between earnings attributes and investor protection.  Even though this study 
attempts to control for the factors suggested by prior studies, there are still some other 
factors (e.g. culture and other aspects of corporate governance) that have not been 
controlled.  Second, this study employs four earnings attribute measures suggested from 
prior studies.  Most of these prior studies are based on the United States.  Perhaps these 
earnings attributes are less applicable in a cross-country setting or are measured with 
error.  Third, some values of the investor protection variables (such as antidirector rights 
and ownership concentration) are the same across the period of this study.  This does not 
reflect the reality of a country’s development in its investor protection level as it is 
probably not constant over time.  Finally, classifying firms on the basis of their country 
of incorporation in Global Vantage Database implies that home-country institutions are 
expected to have the strongest influence on observed earnings attributes.  However, this 
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assumption may introduce a bias into the study since firms engaged in cross-border 
product or financial transactions could also be influenced by the institutions of those 
additional countries.  To that extent, cross-border transactions are expected to diminish 
the power of this study’s tests.
Because of the scarce amount of empirical research examining the impact of 
investor protection on more than one earnings attribute, several possible avenues for 
future research exist.  One avenue for future research is the impact of investor protection 
on market-based earnings attributes (i.e., value relevance, conservatism, timeliness, etc.).  
Another avenue for future research is investigating the mixed results in this study.  As 
noted earlier, Wysocki (2005) challenges the Dechow and Dichev (2002) accruals quality 
model used in this and many other studies.  Replicating the results using an alternative 
specification of accruals quality, such as the one proposed by Wysocki (2005), is a 
second avenue for future research.  
Further, this study raises the possibilities that measures of persistence and 
predictive ability of earnings used in prior literature are not well specified in an 
international context.  For example, the theory could be wrong for some earnings 
attributes such as earnings persistence and earnings predictability.  The theories 
supporting the relationship between investor protection and earnings management are 
supported by the belief that the use of earnings management by insiders to conceal firm 
performance from outsiders can be reduced with strong investor protection.  In other 
words, when a country has a strong investor protection, this protection limits insiders’ 
ability to acquire private control benefits, which reduces their incentives to mask firm 
performance.  However, there is a lack of theories supporting the relationship between 
63
investor protection and other aspects of earnings attributes such as earnings persistence 
and earnings predictability.  Thus, theoretical work on these measures is a third avenue 
for future research.
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APPENDIX 1
Earnings Quality Definitions and Measures
This appendix describes how prior research studies define and measure the quality of 
earnings.
Definitions of Earnings Quality Measures Article (s)
 Firms with high accruals quality will 
have high earnings persistence, which refers 
to high earnings quality. 
- Accruals quality
- Earnings persistence
Dechow and 
Dichev (2002)
 Earnings is of good quality if it has high 
accruals quality and high earnings response 
coefficient.
- Accruals quality
- Earnings response    
   coefficient (ERC)
Balsam et al. 
(2003)
 Earnings is of good quality if it has high 
accruals quality or less absolute abnormal 
accruals
- Accruals quality
- Modified Jones [1991]
Francis et al. 
(2003)
 Earnings is of good quality if it has high 
accruals quality, which refers to the effects 
of changes in accounting estimates (i.e., 
accruals)
- Accruals quality Myers et al. 
(2003)
 Earnings quality is defined as the 
likelihood that a firm can sustain current 
earnings in the future.
- Earnings persistence Beneish and 
Vargus (2002)
 Earnings is of good quality if it is a good 
indicator of future earnings, which refers to 
“substantial earnings”.
- Earnings persistence Penman and 
Zhang (2002)
 Earnings is of good quality if it is high 
persistent.
- Earnings persistence Richardson 
(2003)
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APPENDIX 1 (Concluded)
Earnings Quality Definitions and Measures
Definitions of Earnings Quality Measures Article (s)
 Earnings is of good quality if it has a 
low level of earnings volatility, which 
refers to high predictive ability of 
earnings. 
- Earnings predictability Bricker et al. 
(1995)
 Earnings quality is defined as the extent 
to which a firm’s past earnings is 
associated with its future cash flows.
- Earnings predictability Mikhail et al. 
(2003)
 Earnings is viewed to be of high quality 
if it is characterized by less evidence of 
earnings management, more timely 
recognition of bad news, and a higher 
association with share price.
- Earnings management 
   measures (i.e., earnings 
   smoothness, Jones 
   [1991] model, frequency 
   of small positive earnings)
- Timely loss recognition
- The relation of stock 
   prices with accounting 
   data
Lang et al. 
(2003)
 High earnings quality is in the sense 
that earnings is less likely to distort firms’ 
underlying economic performance.
- Earnings management 
   measures based on Leuz et 
   al. (2003)
Defond et al. 
(2004)
 Earnings is of good quality if it has 
more timely loss recognition.
- Timely loss recognition Ball and 
Shivakumar
(2004)
 Quality of earnings is defined as the 
relationship between profitability and cash 
generating ability.
- Value relevance of cash 
   flow disclosures
Bricker et al. 
(1995)
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APPENDIX 2
Data Source
Variable Variable Name Data Source
TotalAsset Total assets Global Vantage Industry Research and 
Industry Active Files.
REV Total revenue Global Vantage Industry Research and 
Industry Active Files.
PPE Property, plant, and equipment Global Vantage Industry Research and 
Industry Active Files.
CA Total current assets Global Vantage Industry Research and 
Industry Active Files.
CL Total current liabilities Global Vantage Industry Research and 
Industry Active Files.
CASH Cash Global Vantage Industry Research and 
Industry Active Files.
STDEBT Debt in current liabilities Global Vantage Industry Research and 
Industry Active Files.
Dep Depreciation and amortization Global Vantage Industry Research and 
Industry Active Files.
Earn Net income before 
extraordinary items
Global Vantage Industry Research and 
Industry Active Files.
TCA Total current accruals Global Vantage Industry Research and 
Industry Active Files.
TA Total accruals Global Vantage Industry Research and 
Industry Active Files.
CFO Cash flow from operation Global Vantage Industry Research and 
Industry Active Files.
InvRights Anti-director rights La Porta et al. (Working paper, 2004).
JudicSys Efficiency of judiciary La Porta et al. (Working paper, 2004)
RuleofLaw Rule of law La Porta et al. (Working paper, 2004)
Corruption Corruption index La Porta et al. (Working paper, 2004)
Extcap External Cap/GDP La Porta et al. (Working paper, 2004)
DoFirms Domestic Firms/Pop La Porta et al. (Working paper, 2004)
IPOs IPOs/GDP La Porta et al. (Working paper, 2004)
Ownership Ownership Concentration La Porta et al. (Working paper, 2004)
Pub_enf Public Enforcement La Porta et al. (Working paper, 2004)
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APPENDIX 3
TABLE 1
Sample: Firm-Year Observations
Panel A: Firm-year observations based on legal origin
Country Legal Origin 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 N %
Australia English 110 121 165 197 219 236 242 1,290 
Canada English 221 232 240 279 291 297 287 1,847 
Hong Kong English 43 46 81 86 90 98 99 543 
India English 75 77 107 192 191 192 185 1,019 
Malaysia English 135 188 345 383 395 425 431 2,302 
Singapore English 95 98 145 183 227 269 285 1,302 
South Africa English 21 21 43 46 49 48 50 278 
Thailand English 104 142 212 222 223 225 229 1,357 
United Kingdom English 284 380 458 483 522 546 557 3,230 
USA English 1,530 1,621 1,685 1,859 1,895 1,901 1,889 12,380 
2,618 2,926 3,481 3,930 4,102 4,237 4,254 25,548 44.3%
Belgium French 32 45 52 58 77 80 80 424 
Brazil French 39 40 97 104 105 105 105 595 
Chile French 17 19 78 79 80 80 80 433 
France French 159 224 288 345 410 437 436 2,299 
Greece French 9 26 45 56 60 61 59 316 
Indonesia French 59 88 136 153 161 171 184 952 
Italy French 41 80 90 99 142 159 160 771 
Mexico French 29 34 53 53 58 60 60 347 
Netherlands French 64 95 99 106 124 129 129 746 
Philippines French 17 29 90 93 90 92 94 505 
Spain French 46 70 73 84 91 93 94 551 
512 750 1,101 1,230 1,398 1,467 1,481 7,939 13.8%
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TABLE 1 (Continued)
Sample: Firm-Year Observations
Panel A: Firm-year observations based on legal origin (Continued)
Country Legal Origin 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 N %
Austria German 23 34 38 41 46 50 49 281 
Germany German 146 213 271 361 472 491 467 2,421 
Japan German 2,109 2,218 2,295 2,371 2,442 2,488 2,538 16,461 
South Korea German 14 15 74 99 154 189 203 748 
Switzerland German 79 102 120 122 144 150 152 869 
Taiwan German 23 52 142 152 163 182 195 909 
2,394 2,634 2,940 3,146 3,421 3,550 3,604 21,689 37.6%
Denmark Scandinavian 31 49 54 66 84 85 87 456 
Finland Scandinavian 29 48 59 76 89 95 95 491 
Norway Scandinavian 33 46 68 81 98 100 101 527 
Sweden Scandinavian 36 78 121 154 186 188 197 960 
129 221 302 377 457 468 480 2,434 4.2%
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TABLE 1 (Concluded)
Sample: Firm-Year Observations
Panel B: Firm-year observations (all countries)
Country Legal Origin 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 N %
Australia English 110 121 165 197 219 236 242 1,290 2.2%
Austria German 23 34 38 41 46 50 49 281 0.5%
Belgium French 32 45 52 58 77 80 80 424 0.7%
Brazil French 39 40 97 104 105 105 105 595 1.0%
Canada English 221 232 240 279 291 297 287 1,847 3.2%
Chile French 17 19 78 79 80 80 80 433 0.8%
Denmark Scandinavian 31 49 54 66 84 85 87 456 0.8%
Finland Scandinavian 29 48 59 76 89 95 95 491 0.9%
France French 159 224 288 345 410 437 436 2,299 4.0%
Germany German 146 213 271 361 472 491 467 2,421 4.2%
Greece French 9 26 45 56 60 61 59 316 0.5%
Hong Kong English 43 46 81 86 90 98 99 543 0.9%
India English 75 77 107 192 191 192 185 1,019 1.8%
Indonesia French 59 88 136 153 161 171 184 952 1.7%
Italy French 41 80 90 99 142 159 160 771 1.3%
Japan German 2,109 2,218 2,295 2,371 2,442 2,488 2,538 16,461 28.6%
Malaysia English 135 188 345 383 395 425 431 2,302 4.0%
Mexico French 29 34 53 53 58 60 60 347 0.6%
Netherlands French 64 95 99 106 124 129 129 746 1.3%
Norway Scandinavian 33 46 68 81 98 100 101 527 0.9%
Philippines French 17 29 90 93 90 92 94 505 0.9%
Singapore English 95 98 145 183 227 269 285 1,302 2.3%
South Africa English 21 21 43 46 49 48 50 278 0.5%
South Korea German 14 15 74 99 154 189 203 748 1.3%
Spain French 46 70 73 84 91 93 94 551 1.0%
Sweden Scandinavian 36 78 121 154 186 188 197 960 1.7%
Switzerland German 79 102 120 122 144 150 152 869 1.5%
Taiwan German 23 52 142 152 163 182 195 909 1.6%
Thailand English 104 142 212 222 223 225 229 1,357 2.4%
United Kingdom English 284 380 458 483 522 546 557 3,230 5.6%
USA English 1,530 1,621 1,685 1,859 1,895 1,901 1,889 12,380 21.5%
5,653 6,531 7,824 8,683 9,378 9,722 9,819 57,610 100.0%
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TABLE 2
Investor Protection Proxies by Country
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics of Institutional Characteristics
Country Antidirector 
Rights
Efficiency of 
Judicial System
Rule of Law Corruption 
Index
External 
Cap/GDP
Domestic 
Firms/Pop
IPOs/GDP Ownership 
Concentration
Australia 4.00 10.00 2.00 2.05 0.63 66.43 6.49 0.28
Austria 2.00 9.50 2.10 1.93 0.07 12.18 1.71 0.58
Belgium 0.00 9.50 1.64 1.36 0.33 15.62 2.04 0.54
Brazil 3.00 5.75 -0.15 0.01 0.13 2.95 0.04 0.57
Canada 5.00 9.25 2.01 2.30 0.61 92.19 8.49 0.40
Chile 5.00 7.25 1.33 1.54 0.50 23.00 0.36 0.45
Denmark 2.00 10.00 1.97 2.36 0.31 43.71 1.29 0.45
Finland 3.00 10.00 2.13 2.54 0.93 25.78 3.45 0.37
France 3.00 8.00 1.49 1.46 0.49 13.29 2.56 0.34
Germany 1.00 9.00 1.91 1.72 0.26 10.65 3.67 0.48
Greece 2.00 7.00 0.75 0.80 0.25 26.67 12.41 0.67
Hong Kong 5.00 10.00 1.66 1.44 1.39 106.13 8.94 0.54
India 5.00 8.00 0.23 -0.21 0.19 5.98 0.74 0.40
Indonesia 2.00 2.50 -0.90 -1.09 0.12 1.37 1.58 0.58
Italy 1.00 6.75 0.94 0.89 0.19 4.75 5.06 0.58
Japan 4.00 10.00 1.82 1.38 0.59 19.55 2.39 0.18
Malaysia 4.00 9.00 0.55 0.18 0.78 33.02 5.09 0.54
Mexico 1.00 6.00 -0.37 -0.39 0.11 1.94 0.26 0.64
Netherlands 2.00 10.00 1.97 2.34 0.88 14.00 2.80 0.39
Norway 4.00 10.00 2.01 2.11 0.25 43.65 3.26 0.36
Philippines 3.00 4.75 -0.50 -0.49 0.28 2.97 1.69 0.57
Singapore 4.00 10.00 2.12 2.50 0.80 89.20 7.08 0.49
South Africa 5.00 6.00 0.30 0.50 0.78 15.11 0.63 0.52
South Korea 2.00 6.00 0.65 0.45 0.32 15.69 3.97 0.23
Spain 4.00 6.25 1.38 1.66 0.32 18.04 3.11 0.51
Sweden 3.00 10.00 1.98 2.48 0.90 30.40 12.05 0.28
Switzerland 2.00 10.00 2.22 2.22 1.44 33.10 6.98 0.41
Taiwan 3.00 6.75 0.87 0.72 0.83 21.24 9.60 0.18
Thailand 2.00 3.25 0.43 -0.34 0.18 6.69 0.96 0.47
United Kingdom 5.00 10.00 1.93 2.17 1.20 34.97 11.68 0.19
USA 5.00 10.00 1.92 1.77 1.18 28.93 5.54 0.20
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TABLE 2 (Continued)
Investor Protection Proxies by Country
Panel B: Predicted signs of country-year correlation matrix of institutional characteristics
Predicted Sign
InvRights JudicSys RuleofLaw Corruption ExtCap DoFirms IPOs Ownership
InvRights + + + + + + -
JudicSys + + + + + + -
RuleofLaw + + + + + + -
Corruption + + + + + + -
ExtCap + + + + + + -
DoFirms + + + + + + -
IPOs + + + + + + -
Ownership - - - - - - -
Panel C: Correlation coefficients of country-year correlation matrix of institutional characteristics
Correlation Coefficient
InvRights JudicSys RuleofLaw Corruption ExtCap DoFirms IPOs Ownership
InvRights 0.258*** 0.106 0.164** 0.452*** 0.479*** 0.143** -0.396***
JudicSys 0.229*** 0.858*** 0.824*** 0.634*** 0.731*** 0.416*** -0.494***
RuleofLaw 0.149** 0.874*** 0.943*** 0.507*** 0.677*** 0.414*** -0.420***
Corruption 0.176*** 0.848*** 0.965*** 0.554*** 0.671*** 0.391*** -0.435***
ExtCap 0.449*** 0.556*** 0.501*** 0.503*** 0.665*** 0.483*** -0.561***
DoFirms 0.458*** 0.522*** 0.505*** 0.513*** 0.496*** 0.512*** -0.416***
IPOs 0.126* 0.247*** 0.251*** 0.262*** 0.361*** 0.340*** -0.280***
Ownership -0.378*** -0.405*** -0.457*** -0.406*** -0.470*** -0.139** -0.197***
N 217 217 217 217 217 217 217 217
 Pearson correlation matrix is presented in the upper half and Spearman-rank correlation matrix is presented in the lower half. 
***, **, * denote 1% significance, 5% significance, and 10% significance, respectively (two-tailed).
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TABLE 2 (Concluded)
Investor Protection Proxies by Country
Definitions:
• Antidirector rights index indicates how easy it is for shareholders to exercise their voting right.  This index is the antidirector right index constructed by 
La Porta et al. (1998).  This index is formed by adding 1 when (1) the country allows share holders to mail their proxy vote to the firm, (2) shareholders 
are not required to deposit their shares prior to the general shareholders’ meeting, (3) cumulative voting or proportional representation of minorities in 
the board of directors is allowed, (4) an oppressed minorities mechanism is in place, (5) the minimum percentage of share capital that entitles a 
shareholder to call for an extraordinary shareholders’ meeting is less than or equal to 10 percent (the sample median), or (6) share holders have 
preemptive rights that can be waived only by a shareholders’ vote.  The index ranges from zero to six, with higher scores for stronger shareholder rights.
• Efficiency of the judicial system is the index ranging from zero to ten to represent the average of investors’ assessment of conditions of the judicial 
system in each country between 1980 and 1983.  This index is based on LaPorta et al. (1998, 2000, 2004), with higher scores implying greater law 
enforcement.  Source: International Country Risk Guide.
• Rule of law measures the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society in year 2000.  These include perceptions of the 
incidence of both violent and non-violent crime, the effectiveness and predictability of the judiciary, and the enforceability of contracts, with higher 
scores implying greater law enforcement.  Source: Kaufmann et al. (2004).
• Corruption index measures “the exercise of public power for private gain” in year 2000.  It captures aspects ranging from the frequency of additional 
payments to get things done to the effects of corruption on the business environment, with higher scores implying greater law enforcement.  Source 
Kaufmann et al. (2004).
• External Cap/GDP ratio is the average of the ratio of stock market capitalization held by small shareholders to gross domestic product for the period 
1996-2000.  The stock market capitalization held by small shareholders is computed as the product of the aggregate stock market capitalization and the 
average percentage of common shares not owned by the top three shareholders in the ten largest non-financial, privately-owned domestic firms in a 
given country.  A firm is considered privately-owned if the State is not a known shareholder in it.  This ratio is based on La Porta et al. (2004) and used 
to measure the importance of equity market in each country, with the higher values indicating the greater importance of the stock market. Source: La 
Porta et al. (1999), Hartland- Peel (1996) for Kenya, Bloomberg and various annual reports for Ecuador, Jordan, and Uruguay. 
• Domestic Firms/Pop ratio is the ratio of the number of domestic firms listed in a given country to its population (in millions) for the period 1996-2000.
This ratio is based on La Porta et al. (2004) and used to measure the importance of equity market in each country, with the higher values indicating the 
greater importance of the stock market.  Source: International Finance Corporation: Emerging Markets Database (2001) and World Bank (2001).
• IPOs/GDP ratio is the ratio of the equity issued by newly-listed firms in a given country (in thousands) to its gross domestic product (in millions) for the 
period of 1996-2000.  This ratio is based on La Porta et al. (2004) and used to measure the importance of equity market in each country, with the higher 
values indicating the greater importance of the stock market.  Source: Securities Data Corporation, World Bank (2001). 
• The ownership concentration is measured as the average percentage of common shares owned by the top three shareholders in the ten largest non-
financial, privately-owned domestic firms in a given country.  A firm is considered privately-owned if the State is not a known shareholder in it.  This 
percentage is based on La Porta et al. (2004) and implies the legal protection, with higher concentration for poor legal protect.  Source: La Porta et al. 
(1999), Hartland- Peel (1996) for Kenya, Bloomberg and various annual reports for Ecuador, Jordan, and Uruguay.
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TABLE 3
Sample Country’s Mean Accounting Variables
Panel A: Main accounting variables (scaled by lagged total assets) used to calculate each earnings attribute 
Country Legal Origin Legal Tradition N EARN EARNt-1 CFO CFOt-1 CFOt+1 TCA REV PPE
Australia English CM 1,290 -0.03 -0.05 0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.62
Austria German CD 281 0.02 0.01 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.02 0.10 0.86
Belgium French CD 424 0.03 0.02 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.02 0.14 0.74
Brazil French CD 595 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.04 0.07 0.02 0.11 0.87
Canada English CM 1,847 -0.03 -0.03 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.12 0.92
Chile French CD 433 0.05 0.05 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.01 0.05 0.95
Denmark Scandinavian CD 456 0.03 0.02 0.05 0.05 0.08 0.03 0.13 0.69
Finland Scandinavian CD 491 0.05 0.05 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.03 0.19 0.67
France French CD 2,299 0.03 0.03 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.02 0.17 0.46
Germany German CD 2,421 -0.03 -0.01 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.05 0.20 0.70
Greece French CD 316 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.08 0.09 0.07 0.17 0.68
Hong Kong English CM 543 0.00 -0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.00 -0.01 0.50
India English CM 1,019 0.08 0.07 0.10 0.90 0.12 0.02 0.13 0.72
Indonesia French CD 952 0.00 -0.01 0.03 0.03 -0.03 0.01 0.19 0.69
Italy French CD 771 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.10 0.51
Japan German CD 16,461 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.65
Malaysia English CM 2,302 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.01 0.03 0.64
Mexico French CD 347 0.06 0.05 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.01 0.15 0.90
Netherlands French CD 746 0.04 0.03 0.07 0.07 0.09 0.03 0.23 0.67
Norway Scandinavian CD 527 -0.02 -0.01 0.04 0.03 -0.04 0.01 0.17 0.62
Philippines French CD 505 -0.01 -0.03 0.02 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.07 0.74
Singapore English CM 1,302 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.01 0.06 0.59
South Africa English CM 278 0.17 0.09 0.18 0.10 0.10 0.04 0.53 0.67
South Korea German CD 748 0.03 0.02 0.07 0.05 0.07 0.01 0.21 0.64
Spain French CD 551 0.05 0.05 0.08 0.08 0.10 0.02 0.20 0.81
Sweden Scandinavian CD 960 -0.06 -0.05 -0.01 -0.01 -0.04 0.02 0.21 0.48
Switzerland German CD 869 0.04 0.03 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.01 0.08 0.74
Taiwan German CD 909 0.05 0.04 0.07 0.07 0.09 0.02 0.12 0.63
Thailand English CM 1,357 0.03 0.02 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.00 0.05 0.75
UK English CM 3,230 0.01 0.01 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.01 0.12 0.63
USA English CM 12,380 -0.03 -0.02 0.02 0.02 -0.02 0.01 0.16 0.64
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TABLE 3 (Continued)
Sample Country’s Mean Accounting Variables
Panel B: Earnings attribute variables (raw and rank data) used in this study
Country Legal Origin Legal Tradition Stdresid Persist Pred Smooth R_Stdresid R_Persist R_Pred R_Smooth
Australia English CM 0.094 0.521 0.199 1.150 5.00 8.86 3.57 21.43
Austria German CD 0.051 0.578 0.073 1.507 22.43 11.71 19.71 12.86
Belgium French CD 0.059 0.603 0.081 1.415 17.29 13.29 16.71 13.00
Brazil French CD 0.040 0.789 0.058 1.352 25.86 15.43 21.71 14.14
Canada English CM 0.079 0.810 0.162 1.072 10.86 17.29 6.43 23.86
Chile French CD 0.034 0.919 0.051 1.433 28.71 19.86 25.86 12.43
Denmark Scandinavian CD 0.063 0.773 0.107 1.343 15.14 16.43 14.57 15.00
Finland Scandinavian CD 0.060 0.934 0.090 1.240 17.00 20.43 16.57 17.57
France French CD 0.061 0.841 0.071 1.350 16.00 18.86 19.43 13.57
Germany German CD 0.105 1.031 0.144 1.285 4.14 19.00 9.86 15.86
Greece French CD 0.054 0.850 0.066 2.226 20.14 19.43 23.14 6.14
Hong Kong English CM 0.078 0.361 0.197 1.108 9.00 6.57 5.71 23.57
India English CM 0.051 1.085 0.045 1.356 21.57 25.86 27.00 13.29
Indonesia French CD 0.103 0.779 0.125 1.315 4.00 14.43 12.71 16.43
Italy French CD 0.047 0.668 0.059 1.506 23.57 12.71 22.00 7.57
Japan German CD 0.031 0.787 0.032 1.450 29.57 17.14 30.57 9.00
Malaysia English CM 0.074 0.705 0.081 1.298 10.00 16.29 17.43 18.29
Mexico French CD 0.038 0.564 0.076 1.339 27.00 10.43 18.00 14.29
Netherlands French CD 0.072 1.150 0.121 1.161 11.86 22.14 16.14 19.86
Norway Scandinavian CD 0.090 0.649 0.313 1.061 7.71 10.86 3.29 23.14
Philippines French CD 0.071 0.683 0.112 1.862 14.71 13.57 11.71 19.57
Singapore English CM 0.065 0.738 0.074 1.392 13.43 14.71 17.71 13.00
South Africa English CM 0.068 0.414 0.128 1.608 15.14 9.43 9.86 12.57
South Korea German CD 0.061 0.736 0.081 2.363 18.00 15.86 18.71 9.43
Spain French CD 0.051 0.787 0.052 1.753 19.57 16.14 22.86 6.14
Sweden Scandinavian CD 0.081 0.916 0.166 1.186 8.57 18.71 9.43 21.14
Switzerland German CD 0.046 0.802 0.058 1.352 24.00 16.43 22.86 16.29
Taiwan German CD 0.049 0.894 0.061 1.246 21.43 20.43 21.00 17.43
Thailand English CM 0.061 0.661 0.074 1.316 15.86 13.29 19.14 14.00
UK English CM 0.074 0.849 0.133 1.034 10.86 18.29 8.57 26.14
USA English CM 0.091 0.968 0.213 0.946 7.57 22.14 3.71 29.00
Note: these earnings attribute variables are based on the average of a country’s variables obtained from cross-section of data per country per year (1996-2002).
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TABLE 3 (Continued)
Sample Country’s Mean Accounting Variables
Panel C: Country-year correlation matrix of earnings attributes
Predicted Sign Correlation Coefficient
Stdresid Persist Pred Smooth Stdresid Persist Pred Smooth
Stdresid - + + 0.202*** 0.751*** -0.268***
Persist - - - 0.042 0.134** -0.130**
Pred + - + 0.851*** -0.141** -0.304***
Smooth + - + -0.461*** -0.037 -0.579***
N 217 217 217 217
 Pearson correlation matrix is presented in the upper half and Spearman-rank correlation matrix is presented in the lower half. 
 ***, **, * denote 1% significance, 5% significance, and 10% significance, respectively (two-tailed).
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TABLE 3 (Concluded)
Sample Country’s Mean Accounting Variables
Definitions:
• Accruals quality is measured by the standard deviation of the estimated residuals (Stdresid) from pooled firm-year regressions per country 
and year of changes in working capital on last year, present, and one-year ahead cash flows from operations, consistent with Dechow and 
Dichev (2002) and McNichols (2002).
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• Earnings persistence is the slope coefficient estimates (Persist) from pooled firm-year regressions per country and year of current earnings 
on last year earnings.
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• Earnings predictability is the square root of the error variance from earnings persistence equation.
Predj, t = t)( 12  (3)
• Earnings smoothness is the ratio of the country-year standard deviation of operating cash flows to the standard deviation of earnings.
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• R_Stdresid is a descending rank score of “Stdresid”, with the high rank score (31) implying high earnings quality.
• R_Persist is an ascending rank score of “Persist”, with the high rank score (31) implying high earnings quality.
• R_ Pred is a descending rank score of “Pred”, with the high rank score (31) implying high earnings quality.
• R_Smooth is a descending rank score of “Smooth”, with the high rank score (31) implying high earnings quality.
• Legal tradition refers to a common law tradition (CM) or a code law tradition (CD). 
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TABLE 4
Institutional Clusters
The table presents results from a k-means cluster analysis using three distinct clusters and 
eight investor protection proxies from La Porta et al. (2004).  See Table 1 for details.  The 
investor protection proxies are standardized to z-scores when this study performs a k-
means cluster analysis.  Panel A reports the means of the investor protection variables by 
cluster.  Panel B reports the cluster membership for the 31 sample countries based on the 
cluster analysis performed on the proxies in Panel A.  CD (CM) indicates a code law 
(common law) tradition.  Panel C reports a comparison of the cluster membership of 
countries in this study and that in Leuz et al. (2003)
Panel A: Mean values of institutional characteristics by cluster
Institutional Variables Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3
-Antidirector Rights 4.43 2.64 2.80
  Tests of differences between clusters C1 vs. C2*** C2 vs. C3 C1 vs. C3***
-Efficiency of Judicial System 9.89 8.73 5.90
  Tests of differences between clusters C1 vs. C2*** C2 vs. C3*** C1 vs. C3***
- Rule of Law 1.95 1.68 0.13
  Tests of differences between clusters C1 vs. C2*** C2 vs. C3*** C1 vs. C3***
- Corruption Index 2.10 1.70 -0.01
  Tests of differences between clusters C1 vs. C2*** C2 vs. C3*** C1 vs. C3***
- External Cap/GDP Ratio 0.96 0.54 0.30
  Tests of differences between clusters C1 vs. C2*** C2 vs. C3*** C1 vs. C3***
- Domestic Firms/Pop Ratio 64.04 22.11 10.14
  Tests of differences between clusters C1 vs. C2*** C2 vs. C3*** C1 vs. C3***
- IPOs/GDP Ratio 8.61 3.37 2.85
  Tests of differences between clusters C1 vs. C2*** C2 vs. C3 C1 vs. C3***
- Ownership Concentration 0.34 0.39 0.55
  Tests of differences between clusters C1 vs. C2*** C2 vs. C3*** C1 vs. C3***
Outsider features  Insider Features
***, **, * denote mean differences that are reliably significant at 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent 
levels, respectively, under a two-tailed test.
Panel B: Cluster membership of countries (sorted in alphabet order)
Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3
Australia (CM) Austria (CD) Brazil (CD)
Canada (CM) Belgium (CD) Greece (CD)
Hong Kong (CM) Chile (CD) India (CM)
Singapore (CM) Denmark (CD) Indonesia (CD)
Sweden (CD) Finland (CD) Italy (CD)
UK (CM) France (CD) Malaysia (CM)
USA (CM) Germany (CD) Mexico (CD)
Japan (CD) Philippines (CD)
Netherlands (CD) South Africa (CM)
Norway (CD) Thailand (CM)
South Korea (CD)
Spain (CD)
Switzerland (CD)
Taiwan (CD)
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TABLE 4 (Concluded)
Institutional Clusters
Panel C: Cluster membership of countries compared to that of Leuz et al. (2003)
Cluster ClassificationCountry Legal Origin Legal Tradition
This study Leuz et al. (2003)
Australia English CM Cluster 1 Cluster 1
Austria German CD Cluster 2 Cluster 2
Belgium French CD Cluster 2 Cluster 2
Brazil French CD Cluster 3 N/A
Canada English CM Cluster 1 Cluster 1
Chile French CD Cluster 2 N/A
Denmark Scandinavian CD Cluster 2 Cluster 2
Finland Scandinavian CD Cluster 2 Cluster 2
France French CD Cluster 2 Cluster 2
Germany German CD Cluster 2 Cluster 2
Greece French CD Cluster3 Cluster 3
Hong Kong English CM Cluster 1 Cluster 1
India English CM Cluster 3 Cluster 3
Indonesia French CD Cluster 3 Cluster 3
Italy French CD Cluster 3 Cluster 3
Japan German CD Cluster 2 Cluster 2
Malaysia English CM Cluster 3 Cluster 1
Mexico French CD Cluster 3 N/A
Netherlands French CD Cluster 2 Cluster 2
Norway Scandinavian CD Cluster 2 Cluster 1
Philippines French CD Cluster 3 Cluster 3
Singapore English CM Cluster 1 Cluster 1
South Africa English CM Cluster 3 Cluster 2
South Korea German CD Cluster 2 Cluster 3
Spain French CD Cluster 2 Cluster 3
Sweden Scandinavian CD Cluster 1 Cluster 2
Switzerland German CD Cluster 2 Cluster 2
Taiwan German CD Cluster 2 Cluster 2
Thailand English CM Cluster 3 Cluster 3
United Kingdom English CM Cluster 1 Cluster 1
USA English CM Cluster 1 Cluster 1
Definitions:
• Legal origin identifies the legal origin of the company law or commercial code of each country based 
on La Porta et al. (1997)
• Legal tradition equals CM if common law and equals CD if code law.  This classification is based on 
La Porta et al. (1997).
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TABLE 5
Institutional Clusters and Earnings Attributes
The table presents mean values of four accounting based-earnings attributes across three 
distinct clusters based on a k-means cluster analysis.  See Table 2 for details.  Panels A1-
A4 report the cluster membership for the 31 sample countries based on cluster analysis 
performed on the investor protection proxies in Table 2.  Countries in each cluster are 
sorted by the mean-rank scores of accruals quality (Panel A1), earnings persistence 
(Panel A2), earning predictability (Panel A3), and earnings smoothness (Panel A4), 
respectively.  See Table 3, Panel B for details about these mean-rank scores of each 
earnings attribute.  Panel B reports the means by cluster of raw and rank data of each 
earnings attribute.   
Panel A1: Cluster membership of countries sorted by mean-rank accruals quality score
[Country rank value is presented in the parenthesis]
Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3
Singapore (13.43) Japan (29.57) Mexico (27.00)
UK (10.86) Chile (28.71) Brazil (25.86)
Canada (10.86) Switzerland (24.00) Italy (23.57)
Hong Kong (9.00) Austria (22.43) India (21.57)
Sweden (8.57) Taiwan (21.43) Greece (20.14)
USA (7.57) Spain (19.57) Thailand (15.86)
Australia (5.00) South Korea (18.00) South Africa (15.14)
Belgium (17.29) Philippines (14.71)
Finland (17.00) Malaysia (10.00)
France (16.00) Indonesia (4.00)
Denmark (15.14)
Netherlands (11.86)
Norway (7.71)
Germany (4.14)
Mean-Rank Values (rank) 9.33 (3rd) 18.06 (1st) 17.79 (2nd)
Note: Mean-rank accruals quality score is the average of country-year accruals quality rank variables, with 
higher rank implying high earnings quality (i.e., Japan has the highest average-rank score of 29.57; 
Indonesia has the lowest average-rank score of 4.00).
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TABLE 5 (Continued)
Institutional Clusters and Earnings Attributes
Panel A2: Cluster membership of countries sorted by mean-rank earnings persistence score
[Country rank value is presented in the parenthesis]
Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3
USA (22.14) Netherlands (22.14) India (25.86)
Sweden (18.71) Finland (20.43) Greece (19.43)
UK (18.29) Taiwan (20.43) Malaysia (16.29)
Canada (17.29) Chile (19.86) Brazil (15.43)
Singapore (14.71) Germany (19.00) Indonesia (14.43)
Australia (8.86) France (18.86) Philippines (13.57)
Hong Kong (6.57) Japan (17.14) Thailand (13.29)
Switzerland (16.43) Italy (12.71)
Denmark (16.43) Mexico (10.43)
Spain (16.14) South Africa (9.43)
South Korea (15.86)
Belgium (13.29)
Austria (11.71)
Norway (10.86)
Mean-Rank Values (rank) 15.22 (3rd) 17.04 (1st) 15.09 (2nd)
Note: Mean-rank earnings persistence score is the average of country-year earning persistence rank 
variables, with higher rank implying less earnings management or high earnings quality (i.e., India has the 
highest average-rank score of 25.86; Hong Kong has the lowest average-rank score of 6.57).
Panel A3: Cluster membership of countries sorted by mean-rank earnings predictability score
[Country rank value is presented in the parenthesis]
Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3
Singapore (17.71) Japan (30.57) India (27.00)
Sweden (9.43) Chile (25.86) Greece (23.14)
UK (8.57) Switzerland (22.86) Italy (22.00)
Canada (6.43) Spain (22.86) Brazil (21.71)
Hong Kong (5.71) Taiwan (21.00) Thailand (19.14)
USA (3.71) Austria (19.71) Mexico (18.00)
Australia (3.57) France (19.43) Malaysia (17.43)
South Korea (18.71) Indonesia (12.71)
Belgium (16.71) Philippines (11.71)
Finland (16.57) South Africa (9.86)
Netherlands (16.14)
Denmark (14.57)
Germany (9.86)
Norway (3.29)
Mean-Rank Values (rank) 7.88 (3rd) 18.44 (1st) 18.27 (2nd)
Note: Mean-rank earnings predictability score is the average of country-year earning predictability rank 
variables, with higher rank implying less earnings management or high earnings quality (i.e., Japan has the 
highest average-rank score of 30.57; Norway has the lowest average-rank score of 3.29).
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TABLE 5 (Continued)
Institutional Clusters and Earnings Attributes
Panel A4: Cluster membership of countries sorted by mean-rank earnings smoothness score
[Country rank value is presented in the parenthesis]
Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3
USA (29.00) Norway (23.14) Philippines (19.57)
UK (26.14) Netherlands (19.86) Malaysia (18.29)
Canada (23.86) Taiwan (17.43) Indonesia (16.43)
Hong Kong (23.57) Finland (17.57) Mexico (14.29)
Australia (21.43) Switzerland (16.29) Brazil (14.14)
Sweden (21.14) Germany (15.86) Thailand (14.00)
Singapore (13.00) Denmark (15.00) India (13.29)
France (13.57) South Africa (12.57)
Belgium (13.00) Italy (7.57)
Austria (12.86) Greece (6.14)
Chile (12.43)
South Korea (9.43)
Japan (9.00)
Spain (6.14)
Mean-Rank Values (rank) 22.59 (1st) 14.40 (2nd) 13.63 (3rd)
Note: Mean-rank earnings smoothness score is the average of country-year earning smoothness rank 
variables, with higher rank implying less earnings management or high earnings quality (i.e., USA has the 
highest average-rank score of 29.00; Spain and Greece have the lowest average-rank score of 6.14).
Panel B: Mean values of earnings attributes by cluster
Earnings Attributes Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3
Raw data:
- Accruals quality 0.08 0.06 0.06
  Tests of differences between clusters C1 vs. C2*** C2 vs. C3 C1 vs. C3***
- Earnings Persistence 0.74 0.82 0.72
  Tests of differences between clusters C1 vs. C2 C2 vs. C3 C1 vs. C3
- Earnings Predictability 0.16 0.10 0.08
  Tests of differences between clusters C1 vs. C2*** C2 vs. C3 C1 vs. C3***
- Earnings Smoothness 1.13 1.43 1.52
  Tests of differences between clusters C1 vs. C2*** C2 vs. C3 C1 vs. C3***
N 49 98 70
Rank score:
- Accruals quality 9.33 18.06 17.79
  Tests of differences between clusters C1 vs. C2*** C2 vs. C3 C1 vs. C3***
- Earnings Persistence 15.22 17.04 15.09
  Tests of differences between clusters C1 vs. C2 C2 vs. C3 C1 vs. C3
- Earnings Predictability 7.88 18.44 18.27
  Tests of differences between clusters C1 vs. C2*** C2 vs. C3 C1 vs. C3***
- Earnings Smoothness 22.59 14.40 13.63
  Tests of differences between clusters C1 vs. C2*** C2 vs. C3 C1 vs. C3***
N 49 98 70
***, **, * denote mean differences that are reliably significant at 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent 
levels, respectively, under a two-tailed test.
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TABLE 5 (Concluded)
Institutional Clusters and Earnings Attributes
Accounting Variable Definitions:
- Accruals quality is measured by the standard deviation of the estimated residuals (Stdresid) 
from pooled firm-year regressions per country and year of changes in working capital on last 
year, present, and one-year ahead cash flows from operations, consistent with Dechow and 
Dichev (2002) and McNichols (2002).
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- Earnings persistence is the slope coefficient estimates (Persist) from pooled firm-year 
regressions per country and year of current earnings on last year earnings.
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- Earnings predictability is the square root of the error variance from earnings persistence 
equation.
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- Earnings smoothness is the ratio of the country-year standard deviation of operating cash 
flows to the standard deviation of earnings.
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- R_Stdresid is a descending rank score of “Stdresid”, with the high rank score (31) implying 
high earnings quality.
- R_Persist is an ascending rank score of “Persist”, with the high rank score (31) implying high 
earnings quality.
- R_ Pred is a descending rank score of “Pred”, with the high rank score (31) implying high 
earnings quality.
- R_Smooth is a descending rank score of “Smooth), with the high rank score (31) implying 
high earnings quality.
Note: All accounting variables are scaled by lagged total assets.
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TABLE 6
Country-Year Correlation Matrix
Panel A: Country-year correlation matrix between earnings attributes (raw data) and institutional characteristics
Predicted Sign Spearman Rank Correlation Coefficent*
Stdresid Persist Pred Smooth Stdresid Persist Pred Smooth
InvRights - + - - 0.126* 0.041 0.169*** -0.238***
JudicSys - + - - 0.191*** 0.049 0.216*** -0.282***
RuleofLaw - + - - 0.168*** 0.031 0.197*** -0.191***
Corruption - + - - 0.182*** 0.096 0.203*** -0.183***
ExtCap - + - - 0.192*** 0.072 0.197*** -0.294***
DoFirms - + - - 0.260*** -0.039 0.303*** -0.271***
IPOs - + - - 0.262*** 0.093 0.204*** -0.193***
Ownership + - + + -0.119* -0.188*** -0.117* 0.262***
N 217 217 217 217
***, **, * denote 1% significance, 5% significance, and 10% significance, respectively (two-tailed).
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TABLE 6 (Continued)
Country-Year Correlation Matrix
Panel B: Country-year correlation matrix between earnings attributes (rank score) and institutional characteristics
Predicted Sign Spearman Rank Correlation Coefficent*
R_Stdresid R_Persist R_Pred R_Smooth R_Stdresid R_Persist R_Pred R_Smooth
InvRights + + + + -0.121* 0.050 -0.198*** 0.259***
JudicSys + + + + -0.218*** 0.058 -0.250*** 0.298***
RuleofLaw + + + + -0.176*** 0.029 -0.225*** 0.213***
Corruption + + + + -0.202*** 0.088 -0.236*** 0.210***
ExtCap + + + + -0.207*** 0.092 -0.231*** 0.312***
DoFirms + + + + -0.257*** -0.009 -0.311*** 0.279***
IPOs + + + + -0.233*** 0.128* -0.177*** 0.156**
Ownership - - - - 0.126* -0.205*** 0.124* -0.250***
N 217 217 217 217
***, **, * denote 1% significance, 5% significance, and 10% significance, respectively (two-tailed).
Note: R_Stdresid, R_Persist, R_Pred, and R_Smooth are accruals quality, earnings persistence, earnings predictability, and 
earnings smoothness rank variables, respectively.  R_Persist variable is an ascending rank “Persist” variable while the rest 
are descending rank variables, with higher rank implying high earnings quality (i.e. 31 = highest quality; 1 = lowest quality). 
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Table 6 (Concluded)
Country-Year Correlation Matrix
Accounting Variable Definitions:
• Accruals quality is measured by the standard deviation of the estimated residuals (Stdresid) from pooled firm-year regressions per country 
and year of changes in working capital on last year, present, and one-year ahead cash flows from operations, consistent with Dechow and 
Dichev (2002) and McNichols (2002).
• Earnings persistence is the slope coefficient estimates (Persist) from pooled firm-year regressions per country and year of current earnings 
on last year earnings.
• Earnings predictability (Pred) is the square root of the error variance from earnings persistence equation.
• Earnings smoothness (Smooth) is the ratio of the country-year standard deviation of operating cash flows to the standard deviation of 
earnings.
• R_Stdresid is a descending rank score of “Stdresid”, with the high rank score (31) implying high earnings quality.
• R_Persist is an ascending rank score of “Persist”, with the high rank score (31) implying high earnings quality.
• R_ Pred is a descending rank score of “Pred”, with the high rank score (31) implying high earnings quality.
• R_Smooth is a descending rank score of “Smooth”, with the high rank score (31) implying  high earnings quality.
Investor Protection Variable Definitions:
• InvRights is the antidirector rights index.
• JudicSys is the efficiency of the judicial system index.
• RuleofLaw is the rule of law index, mentioned earlier.
• Corruption is the corruption index.
• ExtCap is the ratio of external capitalization to gross domestic product ratio.
• DoFirms is the ratio of the number of domestic firms to its population (in millions).
• IPOs is the ratio of the equity issued newly-listed firms in a given country (in thousands) to its gross domestic product (in millions).
• Ownership is the ownership concentration percentage.
Note: Full investor protection variable definitions are explained in Table 2.
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TABLE 7
Country-Year Regression Analysis Between Earnings Attributes and Investor Protection Proxies
Panel A: Accruals quality rank score (“R_Stdresid”) and institutional characteristic
Prediction Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
Intercept 21.543*** 27.903*** 24.898*** 24.465*** 22.920*** 22.336*** 22.469*** 19.432***
(14.14) (10.97) (15.77) (16.23) (16.42) (17.19) (16.85) (8.57)
InvRights + 0.342
(.74)
JudicSys + -0.696***
-(2.64)
RuleofLaw + -1.922***
-(3.00)
Corruption + -1.634***
-(2.98)
ExtCap + -2.462
-(1.60)
DoFirms + -0.050**
-(2.22)
IPOs + -0.134
-(1.30)
Ownership - 5.940
(1.45)
Pub_enf + -12.871*** -12.250*** -12.708*** -12.561*** -10.828*** -9.670*** -11.469*** -11.694***
-(4.90) -(5.42) -(5.62) -(5.56) -(4.54) -(3.89) -(4.96) -(5.11)
F-value 13.8*** 17.4*** 18.7*** 18.5*** 15.0*** 16.3*** 14.5*** 14.7***
Adj. R2 10.6% 13.2% 14.1% 13.9% 11.4% 12.4% 11.1% 11.2%
N 217 217 217 217 217 217 217 217
***, **, * denote the coefficient estimates that are significantly different then zero at the 1%, 5 %, and 10 % levels, respectively (two-tailed).
t-values are reported in parentheses (two-tailed).
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TABLE 7 (Continued)
Country-Year Regression Analysis Between Earnings Attributes and Investor Protection Proxies
Panel B: Earnings persistence rank score (“R_Persist”) and institutional characteristic
Prediction Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
Intercept 15.186*** 13.370*** 14.937*** 15.014*** 15.440*** 16.066*** 15.509*** 21.379***
(9.40) (4.89) (8.75) (9.22) (10.38) (11.60) (10.96) (9.01)
InvRights + 0.413
(.84)
JudicSys + 0.302
(1.06)
RuleofLaw + 0.651
(.95)
Corruption + 0.602
(1.02)
ExtCap + 1.346
(.82)
DoFirms + -0.042*
-(1.78)
IPOs + 0.141
(1.29)
Ownership - -12.168***
-(2.83)
Pub_enf + -0.905 0.375 0.500 0.469 0.366 2.156 -0.249 -0.241
-(.32) (.15) (.20) (.19) -(.14) (.81) -(.10) -(.10)
F-value 0.4 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.3 1.6 0.8 4.0**
Adj. R2 -0.6% -0.4% -0.5% -0.5% -0.6% 0.5% -0.2% 2.7%
N 217 217 217 217 217 217 217 217
***, **, * denote the coefficient estimates that are significantly different then zero at the 1%, 5 %, and 10 % levels, respectively (two-tailed).
t-values are reported in parentheses (two-tailed).
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TABLE 7 (Continued)
Country-Year Regression Analysis Between Earnings Attributes and Investor Protection Proxies
Panel C: Earnings predictability rank score (“R_Pred”) and institutional characteristic
Prediction Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
Intercept 22.196*** 29.274*** 24.833*** 24.699*** 22.915*** 22.005*** 22.099*** 18.630***
(14.44) (11.54) (15.68) (16.46) (16.41) (17.12) (16.46) (8.15)
InvRights + -0.331
-(.71)
JudicSys + -0.918***
-(3.49)
RuleofLaw + -2.207***
-(3.46)
Corruption + -2.129***
-(3.90)
ExtCap + -3.908**
-(2.54)
DoFirms + -0.083***
-(3.75)
IPOs + -0.175*
-(1.68)
Ownership - 6.659
(1.61)
Pub_enf + -10.083*** -11.423*** -11.893*** -11.823*** -9.252*** -7.235*** -10.398*** -10.736***
-(3.80) -(5.06) -(5.24) -(5.26) -(3.88) -(2.94) -(4.46) -(4.65)
F-value 11.5*** 18.0*** 17.9*** 19.7*** 14.8*** 19.0*** 12.8*** 12.7***
Adj. R2 8.9% 13.6% 13.5% 14.7% 11.4% 14.3% 9.9% 9.8%
N 217 217 217 217 217 217 217 217
***, **, * denote the coefficient estimates that are significantly different then zero at the 1%, 5 %, and 10 % levels, respectively (two-tailed).
t-values are reported in parentheses (two-tailed).
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TABLE 7 (Continued)
Country-Year Regression Analysis Between Earnings Attributes and Investor Protection Proxies
Panel D: Earnings smoothness rank score (“R_Smooth”) and institutional characteristic
Prediction Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
Intercept 8.596*** 0.485 6.668*** 7.154*** 7.797*** 9.622*** 9.490*** 16.515***
(5.68) (.20) (4.26) (4.78) (5.79) (7.41) (7.12) (7.48)
InvRights + 0.744
(1.61)
JudicSys + 1.125***
(4.39)
RuleofLaw + 2.196***
(3.48)
Corruption + 1.874***
(3.44)
ExtCap + 6.279***
(4.24)
DoFirms + 0.051**
(2.27)
IPOs + 0.135
(1.31)
Ownership - -14.755***
-(3.69)
Pub_enf + 9.946*** 12.523*** 12.892*** 12.728*** 9.196*** 9.700*** 11.536*** 11.423***
(3.81) (5.69) (5.74) (5.68) (4.0) (3.91) (4.99) (5.12)
F-value 15.2*** 24.6*** 20.5*** 20.4*** 23.8*** 16.6*** 14.7*** 21.4***
Adj. R2 11.6% 17.9% 15.3% 15.2% 17.4% 12.6% 11.2% 15.9%
N 217 217 217 217 217 217 217 217
***, **, * denote the coefficient estimates that are significantly different then zero at the 1%, 5 %, and 10 % levels, respectively (two-tailed).
t-values are reported in parentheses (two-tailed).
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TABLE 7 (Concluded)
Country-Year Regression Analysis Between Earnings Attributes and Investor Protection Proxies
Models:
Model 1: Earnings attribute = f (InvRights) + control variable
Model 2: Earnings attribute = f (JudicSys) + control variable
Model 3: Earnings attribute = f (Ruleoflaw) + control variable
Model 4: Earnings attribute = f (Corruption) + control variable
Model 5: Earnings attribute = f (ExtCap) + control variable
Model 6: Earnings attribute = f (DoFirms) + control variable
Model 7: Earnings attribute = f (IPOs) + control variable
Model 8: Earnings attribute = f (Ownership) + control variable
Variable Definitions:
R_Stdresid is a descending rank score of “Stdresid”, with the high rank score (31) implying high earnings quality.
R_Persist is an ascending rank score of “Persist”, with the high rank score (31) implying high earnings quality.
R_ Pred is a descending rank score of “Pred”, with the high rank score (31) implying high earnings quality.
R_Smooth is a descending rank score of “Smooth), with the high rank score (31) implying high earnings quality.
InvRights is the antidirector rights index.
JudicSys is the efficiency of the judicial system index.
RuleofLaw is the rule of law index, mentioned earlier.
Corruption is the corruption index.
ExtCap is the ratio of external capitalization to gross domestic product ratio.
DoFirms is the ratio of the number of domestic firms to its population (in millions).
IPOs is the ratio of the equity issued newly-listed firms in a given country (in thousands) to its gross domestic product (in millions).
Ownership is the ownership concentration percentage.
Note: Full investor protection variable definitions are explained in Table 2.
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TABLE 8
Sensitivity Test 1: Regression Analysis Between Earnings Attributes and Investor Protection Proxies
Panel A: Accruals quality (rank score) and institutional characteristic (rank data)
Prediction Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
Intercept 20.600*** 24.219*** 24.373*** 24.382*** 22.519*** 23.265*** 23.562*** 19.210***
(15.24) (15.69) (15.21) (15.60) (15.85) (16.42) (16.32) (11.65)
R_InvRights + 0.038
(.50)
R_JudicSys + -0.214***
-(3.26)
R_RuleofLaw + -0.201***
-(3.15)
R_Corruption + -0.211***
-(3.32)
R_ExtCap + -0.136**
-(2.03)
R_DoFirms + -0.193***
-(2.94)
R_IPOs + -0.201***
-(3.11)
R_Ownership - 0.097
(1.49)
R_Pub_enf + -0.325*** -0.300*** -0.323*** -0.313*** -0.272*** -0.261*** -0.271*** -0.298***
-(4.37) -(4.72) -(5.05) -(4.93) -(4.06) -(3.97) -(4.19) -(4.57)
F-value 11.3*** 17.0*** 16.6*** 17.2*** 13.4*** 15.9*** 16.5*** 12.4***
Adj. R2 8.7% 12.9% 12.6% 13.1% 10.3% 12.1% 12.5% 9.5%
N 217 217 217 217 217 217 217 217
***, **, * denote the coefficient estimates that are significantly different then zero at the 1%, 5 %, and 10 % levels, respectively (two-tailed).
t-values are reported in parentheses (two-tailed).  Note: The index of public enforcement equals the arithmetic mean of: (1) Supervisor characteristics index; (2) 
Rule-making power index; (3) Investigative powers index; (4) Orders index; and (5) Criminal index based on La Porta et al. (2004).
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TABLE 8 (Continued)
Sensitivity Test 1: Regression Analysis Between Earnings Attributes and Investor Protection Proxies
Panel B: Earnings persistence (rank score) and Institutional Characteristic (rank data)
Prediction Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
Intercept 15.374*** 14.984*** 15.399*** 14.455*** 14.756*** 15.978*** 14.263*** 19.532***
(10.83) (9.03) (8.95) (8.62) (9.84) (10.52) (9.26) (11.46)
R_InvRights + 0.063
(.79)
R_JudicSys + 0.059
(.84)
R_RuleofLaw + 0.029
(.43)
R_Corruption + 0.088
(1.29)
R_ExtCap + 0.097
(1.38)
R_DoFirms + -0.006
-(.09)
R_IPOs + 0.125
(1.81)
R_Ownership - -0.207***
-(3.07)
R_Pub_enf + -0.024 0.004 0.008 0.009 -0.019 0.008 -0.016 -0.014
-(.31) (.06) (.12) (.13) -(.27) (.11) -(.23) -(.21)
F-value 0.3 0.4 0.1 0.8 1.0 0.0 1.6 4.7***
Adj. R2 -0.6% -0.6% -0.9% -0.2% 0.0% -0.9% 0.6% 3.3%
N 217 217 217 217 217 217 217 217
***, **, * denote the coefficient estimates that are significantly different then zero at the 1%, 5 %, and 10 % levels, respectively (two-tailed).
t-values are reported in parentheses (two-tailed).  Note: The index of public enforcement equals the arithmetic mean of: (1) Supervisor characteristics index; (2) 
Rule-making power index; (3) Investigative powers index; (4) Orders index; and (5) Criminal index based on La Porta et al. (2004).
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TABLE 8 (Continued)
Sensitivity Test 1: Regression Analysis Between Earnings Attributes and Investor Protection Proxies
Panel C: Earnings predictability (rank score) and Institutional Characteristic (rank data)
Prediction Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
Intercept 21.264*** 24.440*** 24.885*** 24.629*** 22.579*** 23.628*** 22.539*** 18.920***
(15.66) (15.87) (15.62) (15.80) (15.87) (16.79) (15.35) (11.40)
R_InvRights + -0.077
-(1.01)
R_JudicSys + -0.247***
-(3.78)
R_RuleofLaw + -0.248***
-(3.91)
R_Corruption + -0.244***
-(3.86)
R_ExtCap + -0.166**
-(2.49)
R_DoFirms + -0.248***
-(3.79)
R_IPOs + -0.146**
-(2.22)
R_Ownership - 0.097*
(1.47)
R_Pub_enf + -0.252*** -0.280*** -0.307*** -0.295*** -0.245*** -0.229*** -0.262*** -0.279***
-(3.36) -(4.42) -(4.84) -(4.66) -(3.66) -(3.51) -(3.99) -(4.26)
F-value 10.3*** 17.5*** 18.0*** 17.8*** 13.1*** 17.5*** 12.4*** 10.9***
Adj. R2 7.9% 13.3% 13.6% 13.5% 10.1% 13.3% 9.5% 8.4%
N 217 217 217 217 217 217 217 217
***, **, * denote the coefficient estimates that are significantly different then zero at the 1%, 5 %, and 10 % levels, respectively (two-tailed).
t-values are reported in parentheses (two-tailed).  Note: The index of public enforcement equals the arithmetic mean of: (1) Supervisor characteristics index; (2) 
Rule-making power index; (3) Investigative powers index; (4) Orders index; and (5) Criminal index based on La Porta et al. (2004).
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TABLE 8 (Continued)
Sensitivity Test 1: Regression Analysis Between Earnings Attributes and Investor Protection Proxies
Panel D: Earnings smoothness (rank score) and Institutional Characteristic (rank data)
Prediction Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
Intercept 9.559*** 6.066*** 6.509*** 7.036*** 7.799*** 8.050*** 9.206*** 14.497***
(7.19) (4.07) (4.15) (4.56) (5.67) (5.77) (6.34) (9.08)
R_InvRights + 0.129*
(1.72)
R_JudicSys + 0.296***
(4.67)
R_RuleofLaw + 0.240***
(3.84)
R_Corruption + 0.219***
(3.50)
R_ExtCap + 0.241***
(3.72)
R_DoFirms + 0.213***
(3.28)
R_IPOs + 0.109*
(1.67)
R_Ownership - -0.220***
-(3.48)
R_Pub_enf + 0.274*** 0.325*** 0.353*** 0.342*** 0.272*** 0.284*** 0.316*** 0.314***
(3.74) (5.29) (5.65) (5.44) (4.20) (4.39) (4.85) (4.98)
F-value 15.2*** 25.8*** 21.8*** 20.4*** 21.3*** 19.6*** 15.1*** 20.4***
Adj. R2 11.6% 18.7% 16.2% 15.2% 15.8% 14.7% 11.6% 15.2%
N 217 217 217 217 217 217 217 217
***, **, * denote the coefficient estimates that are significantly different then zero at the 1%, 5 %, and 10 % levels, respectively (two-tailed).
t-values are reported in parentheses (two-tailed).  Note: The index of public enforcement equals the arithmetic mean of: (1) Supervisor characteristics index; (2) 
Rule-making power index; (3) Investigative powers index; (4) Orders index; and (5) Criminal index based on La Porta et al. (2004).
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TABLE 8 (Concluded)
Sensitivity Test 1: Regression Analysis Between Earnings Attributes and Investor Protection Proxies
Models:
Model 1: Earnings attribute = f (R_InvRights) + control variable
Model 2: Earnings attribute = f (R_JudicSys) + control variable
Model 3: Earnings attribute = f (R_Ruleoflaw) + control variable
Model 4: Earnings attribute = f (R_Corruption) + control variable
Model 5: Earnings attribute = f (R_ExtCap) + control variable
Model 6: Earnings attribute = f (R_DoFirms) + control variable
Model 7: Earnings attribute = f (R_IPOs) + control variable
Model 8: Earnings attribute = f (R_Ownership) + control variable
Variable Definitions:
R_Stdresid is a descending rank score of “Stdresid”, with the high rank score (31) implying high earnings quality.
R_Persist is an ascending rank score of “Persist”, with the high rank score (31) implying high earnings quality.
R_ Pred is a descending rank score of “Pred”, with the high rank score (31) implying high earnings quality.
R_Smooth is a descending rank score of “Smooth), with the high rank score (31) implying high earnings quality.
 R_InvRights = Rank score of “InvRights” in an ascending order, with high rank score (31) implying high investor protection.
 R_JudicSys = Rank score of “JudicSys” in an ascending order, with high rank score (31) implying high investor protection.
 R_RuleofLaw = Rank score of “RuleofLaw” in an ascending order, with high rank score (31) implying high investor protection.
 R_Corruption = Rank score of “Corruption” in an ascending order, with high rank score (31) implying high investor protection.
 R_ExtCap = Rank score of “ExtCap” in an ascending order, with high rank score (31) implying high investor protection.
 R_DoFirms = Rank score of “DoFirms” in an ascending order, with high rank score (31) implying high investor protection.
 R_IPOs = Rank score of “IPOs” in an ascending order, with high rank score (31) implying high investor protection.
 R_Ownership = Rank score of “Ownership” in an ascending order, with high rank score (31) implying low investor protection.
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TABLE 9
Sensitivity Test 2: Country-Year Correlation Matrix
This table presents Spearman-rank correlation matrix of results when all accounting variables are scaled using averaged total assets 
instead of lagged total assets.
Panel A: Spearman-rank correlation matrix between earnings attributes
Predicted Sign Spearman Rank Correlation
Stdresid Persist Pred Smooth Stdresid Persist Pred Smooth
Stdresid 1.000 1.000
Persist - 1.000 -0.114* 1.000
Pred + - 1.000 0.839*** -0.241*** 1.000
Smooth + - + 1.000 -0.614*** 0.025 -0.715*** 1.000
N 217 217 217 217
***, **, * denote 1% significance, 5% significance, and 10% significance, respectively (two-tailed).
Panel B: Spearman-rank correlation matrix between institutional characteristics and earnings attributes (rank score)
Predicted Sign Spearman Rank Correlation
R_Stdresid R_Persist R_Pred R_Smooth R_Stdresid R_Persist R_Pred R_Smooth
InvRights + + + + -0.110 0.100 -0.224*** 0.254***
JudicSys + + + + -0.201*** 0.066 -0.230*** 0.297***
RuleofLaw + + + + -0.160** 0.044 -0.203*** 0.228***
Corruption + + + + -0.164** 0.097 -0.197*** 0.200***
ExtCap + + + + -0.185*** 0.123* -0.218*** 0.299***
DoFirms + + + + -0.244*** 0.046 -0.308*** 0.305***
IPOs + + + + -0.174** 0.157** 0.132** 0.176***
Ownership - - - - 0.060 -0.215*** 0.077 -0.208***
N 217 217 217 217
***, **, * denote 1% significance, 5% significance, and 10% significance, respectively (two-tailed).
104
TABLE 9 (Concluded)
Sensitivity Test 2: Country-Year Correlation Matrix
Variable Definitions:
• Accruals quality is measured by the standard deviation of the estimated residuals (Stdresid) from pooled firm-year regressions per country 
and year of changes in working capital on last year, present, and one-year ahead cash flows from operations, consistent with Dechow and 
Dichev (2002) and McNichols (2002).
• Earnings persistence is the slope coefficient estimates (Persist) from pooled firm-year regressions per country and year of current earnings 
on last year earnings.
• Earnings predictability (Pred) is the square root of the error variance from earnings persistence equation.
• Earnings smoothness (Smooth) is the ratio of the country-year standard deviation of operating cash flows to the standard deviation of 
earnings.
• R_Stdresid is a descending rank score of “Stdresid”, with the high rank score (31) implying high earnings quality.
• R_Persist is an ascending rank score of “Persist”, with the high rank score (31) implying high earnings quality.
• R_ Pred is a descending rank score of “Pred”, with the high rank score (31) implying high earnings quality.
• R_Smooth is a descending rank score of “Smooth), with the high rank score (31) implying  high earnings quality.
• InvRights is the antidirector rights index.
• JudicSys is the efficiency of the judicial system index.
• RuleofLaw is the rule of law index, mentioned earlier.
• Corruption is the corruption index.
• ExtCap is the ratio of external capitalization to gross domestic product ratio.
• DoFirms is the ratio of the number of domestic firms to its population (in millions).
• IPOs is the ratio of the equity issued newly-listed firms in a given country (in thousands) to its gross domestic product (in millions).
• Ownership is the ownership concentration percentage.
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TABLE 10
Sensitivity Test 3: Country-Year Correlation Matrix
This table presents Spearman-rank correlation matrix of results if change in tax payable is not part of the calculation for total accruals 
and total current accruals as follows:
TAj,t =
=
Firm j’s total accruals in year t.
(CAj,t - CLj,t - Cashj,t + STDEBTj,t – Depj,t).
TCAj,t =
=
Firm j’s total current accruals in year t.
(CAj,t - CLj,t - Cashj,t + STDEBTj,t ).
Panel A: Spearman-rank correlation matrix between earnings attributes
Predicted Sign Spearman Rank Correlation
Stdresid Persist Pred Smooth Stdresid Persist Pred Smooth
Stdresid 1.000 1.000
Persist - 1.000 0.028 1.000
Pred + - 1.000 0.857*** -0.140** 1.000
Smooth + - + 1.000 -0.482*** -0.047 -0.576*** 1.000
N 217 217 217 217
***, **, * denote 1% significance, 5% significance, and 10% significance, respectively (two-tailed).
Variable Definitions: 
• Accruals quality is measured by the standard deviation of the estimated residuals (Stdresid) from pooled firm-year regressions per country 
and year of changes in working capital on last year, present, and one-year ahead cash flows from operations, consistent with Dechow and 
Dichev (2002) and McNichols (2002).
• Earnings persistence is the slope coefficient estimates (Persist) from pooled firm-year regressions per country and year of current earnings 
on last year earnings.
• Earnings predictability (Pred) is the square root of the error variance from earnings persistence equation.
• Earnings smoothness (Smooth) is the ratio of the country-year standard deviation of operating cash flows to the standard deviation of 
earnings.
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TABLE 10 (Concluded)
Sensitivity Test 3: Country-Year Correlation Matrix
Panel B: Spearman-rank correlation matrix between institutional characteristics and earnings attributes (rank score)
Predicted Sign Spearman Rank Correlation
R_Stdresid R_Persist R_Pred R_Smooth R_Stdresid R_Persist R_Pred R_Smooth
InvRights + + + + -0.123* 0.050 -0.196*** 0.239***
JudicSys + + + + -0.209*** 0.057 -0.250*** 0.285***
RuleofLaw + + + + -0.172** 0.029 -0.225*** 0.202***
Corruption + + + + -0.195*** 0.088 -0.237*** 0.204***
ExtCap + + + + -0.205*** 0.092 -0.231*** 0.303***
DoFirms + + + + -0.268*** -0.009 -0.310*** 0.271***
IPOs + + + + -0.233*** 0.128* -0.178*** 0.171**
Ownership - - - - 0.114* -0.203*** 0.123* -0.224***
N 217 217 217 217
***, **, * denote 1% significance, 5% significance, and 10% significance, respectively (two-tailed).
Variable Definitions:
• R_Stdresid is a descending rank score of “Stdresid”, with the high rank score (31) implying high earnings quality.
• R_Persist is an ascending rank score of “Persist”, with the high rank score (31) implying high earnings quality.
• R_ Pred is a descending rank score of “Pred”, with the high rank score (31) implying high earnings quality.
• R_Smooth is a descending rank score of “Smooth), with the high rank score (31) implying  high earnings quality.
• InvRights is the antidirector rights index.
• JudicSys is the efficiency of the judicial system index.
• RuleofLaw is the rule of law index, mentioned earlier.
• Corruption is the corruption index.
• ExtCap is the ratio of external capitalization to gross domestic product ratio.
• DoFirms is the ratio of the number of domestic firms to its population (in millions).
• IPOs is the ratio of the equity issued newly-listed firms in a given country (in thousands) to its gross domestic product (in millions).
• Ownership is the ownership concentration percentage.
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FIGURE 1
Empirical Relations between Earnings Attributes and Investor Protection
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